September 13, 2004

Randy J. Riley, Administrative Law Judge
Department of Public Welfare
2330 Vartan Way, Second Floor
Harrisburg, Pa 17110

Dear Mr. Riley:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Proposed Regulation #14-488 (#2416), Medical Assistance Provider Appeal Procedure, Department of Public Welfare, 55 PA Code Chapter 41. Pennsylvania Community Providers Association represents more than 150 community mental health, substance abuse and mental retardation service providers in Pennsylvania. As such, the association is very interested in a fair and timely process for Medical Assistance hearings and appeals. Comments are provided on the Proposed Rulemaking found in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, Volume 34, Number 33, dated August 14, 2004. Comments are provided by section with a brief restatement of the proposed rule, followed by the comments.

§ 41.1 Scope
(b) "In addition to this chapter, GRAPP and other applicable Departmental regulations apply to the practice and procedures in MA provider appeals, except as specifically superseded in relevant sections of this chapter."

The phrase "other applicable Department regulations" should be deleted as being too broad and all encompassing. Other regulations may conflict and may serve to limit remedies available to providers.

§ 41.5 Jurisdiction of the Bureau.
(b) "The Bureau has no jurisdiction to make a final determination on a waiver request included in a request for hearing."
(c) "The Bureau has no jurisdiction to issue a final determination on the merits of an issue properly raised in a petition for relief."

These requirements excessively limit the jurisdiction of the Bureau and should be deleted.
§ 41.21 Notice of agency actions.
(a)(3) "By publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin if the agency action applies to a class of providers or makes system-wide changes affecting more than a single provider."

Regardless of the number of providers affected, the provider(s) who request the hearing should receive individual notice of any agency action.

§ 41.32 Timeliness and perfection of requests for hearing.
(d) "...A general objection to an agency action shall be deemed a failure to object and shall constitute a waiver of the objections and issues relating to an action."

If a provider raises specific issues, and also includes a general objection to requirements, it appears that this negates all of the issues raised related to that action. This language should be revised to clarify that issues presented with sufficient specificity are not invalidated.

§ 41.53 Circumstances affecting grant or denial.
(b) "A supersedeas will not be issued if injury to the public health, safety or welfare exists or is threatened during the period when the supersedeas would be in effect. If State law or Federal law or regulation require that an action take effect prior to the final determination of an appeal, injury to the public health, safety or welfare shall be deemed to exist."

The first sentence of this section addresses consideration for public health, safety and welfare. The second sentence is superfluous for this consideration and also serves to unduly limit the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

§ 41.112 Filing of position paper.
(a) "...If the provider fails to meet the position paper due date or fails to supply the Bureau with the required documentation, the Bureau will dismiss the provider's appeal."
(b) "...If the program office fails to meet the position paper due date, the Bureau will schedule the case for hearing and will notify the Chief Counsel of the Department."

The standards should be the same for both the provider and the program.

§ 41.117 Penalties for noncompliance.
(a) "A party will not be permitted to offer the testimony of a witness at a hearing on a provider appeal unless either the party disclosed the identity of the witness in the party's position paper or the party establishes that there is good cause to permit the testimony of the witness."
It must be clear that "good cause" to permit the testimony of a witness not identified in the party's position paper includes instances such as the death of an identified witness, or that the identified witness is no longer employed by the party but another individual functions in that capacity.

§ 41.171 Independence
(a) "The presiding officers will act independently of employees or public officials of the Department whose actions are subject to review before the Bureau."
(b) "The presiding officers may not engage in ex parte communications concerning a hearing with a party to the hearing."

What oversight is provided to assure compliance with these provisions? What sanctions will be applied for noncompliance?

Although it was noted in specific sections above, a general concern throughout this proposed rulemaking is that standards should be equivalent for providers and programs. In several instances it appears that standards are more stringent for providers. Please contact Betty Simmonds of my staff if you have questions regarding these comments.

Sincerely,

George J. Kimes
Executive Director
Pennsylvania Community Providers Association
george@papproviders.org

cc: IRRC
Pennsylvania Community Providers Association
2400 Park Drive
Harrisburg, PA 17110
717-657-7078
717-657-3552 FAX

To: Randy J. Riley/IRRC
Fax Number: 717-772-2769/717-783-2664
From: Betty M. Simmonds
Date: 9.13.04
Re: Comments on MA provider appeal procedure

Please see attached.
September 13, 2004

Original: 2416
Department of Public Welfare
Randy J. Riley
Administrative Law Judge
2330 Vartan Way
Second Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17110

Dear Mr. Riley:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. PANPHA is a statewide association of more than 330 non-profit senior service providers, including nursing homes. PANPHA reviewed and provided comments on the Standing Practice Order on March 31, 2003 and we note that two revisions we suggested were made to the proposed regulation. PANPHA staff and Financial Issues Committee members reviewed the proposed regulation #14-488 published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin (34 Pa.B. 4447) on August 14, 2004 and have the following comments.

1. **413 Definitions** - “Senior Department Official” is defined too broadly. Eliminate “…an individual who works in the office of the Secretary or who reports directly to the Secretary, including…”

2. **415 - Scope** - Delete sections (b) and (c) because they limit the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

3. **4131 Request for Hearing** - Delete “Detailed” from 41.31 (d)(2). This provides the Bureau with the ability to review requests much too subjectively. In addition, add a provision for a protective request for a hearing to allow a provider to file a request for a hearing to preserve its right to contest a disputed agency action at a time when it can not have all of the information it needs to decide whether the issue is worth pursuing.

4. **4111(f) Disclosures** - does not place the same burden on the Department regarding the initial mandatory disclosure that is placed upon the provider. The regulation should hold the Department to the same standard required of providers.

5. **4112 (a) and (b) Position Papers** - If the Department fails to meet a timeframe for filing a position paper, the result should be the same as the result for a provider that fails to meet a timeframe. That is, if the program office fails to meet the position paper due date, the Bureau should recommend ruling in the provider’s favor. At a minimum, the
must be a mechanism to ensure that if the Department fails to meet its time obligation for the position paper, the provider must be given adequate time to review the Department's position paper before a hearing is scheduled.

6. **41.171 Independence** – PANPHA members question what oversight there is to assure compliance with this provision. What are the sanctions for noncompliance?

7. **41.153 – Burden of Proof and Production** – The burden of proof should not be on the provider at all times, but instead be on the Department when it imposes a penalty or seeks another action against a provider and on the provider when appealing Departmental action.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,

W. Russell McDaid
V.P. Public Policy
russ@panpha.org
Please file this email and its attachment under "proposed comments" for #2416.

-----Original Message-----
From: Beth Greenberg [mailto:beth@panpha.org]
Sent: Monday, September 13, 2004 5:10 PM
To: Jewett, John H.
Subject: MA Provider Appeals reg #14-488 (#2416) comment from PANPHA

Hi John, Thanks for the information and request for comments on this reg. Here are PANPHA's comments.

Beth Greenberg
Public Policy Analyst
PANPHA
1100 Bent Creek Blvd.
Mechanicsburg, PA 17050
717-763-5724
717-763-1057
beth@panpha.org

Thanks to all attendees and exhibitors for making this year's conference a resounding success! Save the dates for PANPHA's 2005 conference in Hershey June 15-17.
September 13, 2004

Via Hand Delivery

The Honorable Randy J. Riley
Administrative Law Judge
Department of Public Welfare
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
2330 Vartan Way, Second Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17110

Re: Proposed Rulemaking: Medical Assistance Provider Appeal Procedure

Dear Judge Riley:

The Pennsylvania Health Care Association ("PHCA") submits the following comments with respect to the proposed rules governing medical assistance provider appeals before the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals ("BHA") of the Department of Public Welfare ("DPW"), published at 34 Pa. Bull. 4441 (Aug. 13, 2004). As you know, PHCA represents more than 200 nursing homes across the Commonwealth that participate in the Medical Assistance Program ("Medicaid" or "MA Program"), which DPW administers. Our nursing home members provide health care and related services to more than 15,000 Medicaid recipients each day. As a consequence, PHCA and its members have a significant interest in the rules of procedure governing appeals before the BHA.

Indeed, we were intimately involved in crafting the legislation that the General Assembly ultimately enacted as the Act of December 3, 2002, P.L. 1174, No. 142, 67 Pa.C.S. Chapter 11 ("Act 142"). The overriding purpose of Act 142 is to assure that providers receive de novo review of claims raised before BHA. Act 142, moreover, requires that DPW adopt rules governing proceedings before BHA that are reasonable, balanced and consistent with settled principles of law. Unfortunately, and despite the efforts of the advisory committee, we reluctantly have concluded that the proposed rules do not achieve their intended statutory purpose and unreasonably and unnecessarily favor DPW's interests over those of providers. We therefore urge DPW to substantially revamp the proposed rules prior to final publication and implementation. To do otherwise will establish rules that directly contravene important elements of Act 142 and other settled principles of Pennsylvania law and will deprive providers of the fair hearing to which they are both constitutionally and statutorily entitled.
General Observations

PHCA is deeply troubled by the degree to which the proposed rules fail to implement the letter and intent of Act 142. We believe that the proposed rules improperly and, in some circumstances, unlawfully limit the discretion of BHA to conduct hearings in a fair and impartial manner. We offer three general observations in support of this conclusion, which will be followed by detailed comments that offer additional elaboration and specific suggested corrective amendments.

First, the proposed rules clearly contravene governing provisions of Pennsylvania law. Act 142 requires that BHA "[c]onduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider in the request for hearing." 67 Pa.C.S § 1102(E)(2)(VII)(emphasis supplied). The proposed rules, however, unduly restrict providers' right to such review. Governing Pennsylvania case law, moreover, clearly establishes that a party asserting a proposition bears the burden of proving it, yet the proposed rules, without statutory authority, override this principle by imposing the burden of proof on providers in all cases. The proposed rules are inconsistent with Pennsylvania law in several other areas, including limits on the providers' ability to request a hearing, to petition for relief, to seek declaratory relief and to appropriately challenge a regulation, and limits on BHA's ability to consider claims involving waivers and expedited appeals.

Second, the proposed rules improperly shift the burden of proof under common law from the party asserting a proposition to the provider in all cases. Not only is there no authority for this shift in Act 142, it underscores the inequity inherent in the overreaching scope of the proposed rules.

Third, the proposed rules are fundamentally unfair to providers. While there are a number of provisions in the proposed rules that lend support to this conclusion, all of which will be addressed subsequently, the pleading and disclosure requirements alone conclusively demonstrate this inherent unfairness.

While providers must plead complaints with detailed specificity, DPW need not answer complaints at all. While providers must identify all individuals with knowledge of the facts and circumstances under consideration, DPW need disclose only its anticipated witnesses. While providers must make detailed disclosures of factual and legal bases for appeals in their hearing requests, DPW need not reciprocate until after the close of discovery and receipt of position papers and expert reports from providers. Essentially, therefore, DPW need not provide any information concerning its factual and legal theories until discovery has ended and providers have revealed the entirety of their case. DPW also need never disclose the names of agency employees with relevant information, unless the agency intends to call them as witnesses. Obviously, this allows DPW to avoid disclosing the names of witnesses who might have information damaging to its case or helpful to its opposition. Providers, of course, lack this luxury. Such obvious and undue bias in favor of DPW hardly is consistent with fundamental fairness, much less the intent and specific provisions of Act 142.
These general observations, of course, are merely "the tip of the iceberg," and the specific comments that follow further illustrate the patent unfairness of the proposed rules. In addition, there are several provisions that require clarification, which we also will address at the conclusion of our comments.

Specific Comments

We have organized around three topics: (1) the ways in which the proposed rules are contrary to Pennsylvania law, including the enabling legislation itself; (2) the ways in which the proposed rules deny fundamental fairness to providers; and (2) the provisions of the proposed rules that require clarification. In most cases, our comments begin with a brief restatement of the language of concern followed by a discussion of the reasons why the language should be deleted or revised. Where appropriate, we have recommended specific revisions.

I. The Proposed Rules are Inconsistent with Key Provisions of Pennsylvania Law

A. The Proposed Rules Undermine the Providers' Right to De Novo Review

Act 142 affords Medicaid providers an unqualified right to a hearing before the BHA following an adverse decision by DPW and mandates that BHA “[c]onduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider.” 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E)(2)(VII). A number of provisions contained in the proposed rules undermine this unqualified right and therefore should be stricken or amended as appropriate.

First, the proposed rules seek to deprive BHA of “jurisdiction to make a final determination on a waiver request included in a request for a hearing,” Proposed Rule 41.5(b). If a provider raises the availability of a waiver as a basis for its appeal, then BHA is obligated to resolve the question presented in the same manner as any other factual or legal issue presented by the provider. See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1105(A) (mandating that BHA “issue a determination adjudicating contested issues of fact and law and any appropriate order, decree or decision”). Act 142, thus, does not provide, or allow, for the limitation on BHA’s jurisdiction proposed in section 41.5(b).

Second, the proposed rules unduly restrict a provider’s right to challenge a regulation. In particular, Proposed Rule 41.41(a) states: “A provider may include a waiver request in a petition for relief only if the regulation that is the subject of the waiver request is not a basis for an agency action involving the provider.” The scope of the proposed rulemaking is limited to adopting rules to implement Act 142. As set forth in the notice of proposed rulemaking, the authority for the proposed rules is Act 142 and, in particular, 67 Pa.C.S. § 1106(A), which provides: “By July 1, 2004, the Bureau, through the Department, shall promulgate regulations establishing rules of procedure as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” Act 142 provides for hearings before BHA initiated by providers who are aggrieved by
adjudications by DPW. Thus, Act 142 does not address, or govern, petitions for the issuance, amendment or repeal of the regulations filed with DPW under the GRAPP. Proposed rule 41.41(a) is beyond the scope of the rulemaking authorized by Act 142 and therefore should be deleted. Moreover, there is otherwise no authority for DPW’s attempt to limit the scope of petitions filed under the GRAPP.

Third, the proposed rules purports to limit the scope of “petitions for relief,” Proposed Rule 41.41(a). As defined in the proposed rules, a “petition for relief” is a “document filed under § 35.17, § 35.18 or § 35.19 (relating to petitions generally; petitions for issuance, amendment, waiver or deletion of regulations; and petitions for declaratory orders) of the GRAPP.” On its face, therefore, proposed regulation 41.41(a) addresses matters beyond the scope of the rulemaking authority in Act 142.

Because proposed regulation 41.41(a) is beyond the scope of authority delegated to DPW by Act 142, DPW cannot rely on Act 142 as the authority for adopting the proposed regulation. This section should therefore be deleted from the proposed regulations to be adopted pursuant to Act 142. To the extent DPW seeks to impose limits on petitions for relief authorized by GRAPP, it must identify clear statutory authority for doing so and must then publish a notice of proposed rulemaking for public comment.

Fourth, the proposed rules improperly overreach in restricting a provider’s ability to obtain consideration of waivers. Proposed rule 41.41(c) provides: “To the extent that the waiver sought by a provider in a petition for relief has been or could have been included in a request for hearing, the Bureau will dismiss the petition for relief.” Like proposed rule 41.41(a), proposed rule 41.41(c) purports to address matters beyond the scope of Act 142. Because it will create unnecessary litigation and because no valid public purpose is served thereby proposed rule 41.41(c) should be deleted.

A provider is authorized to seek a waiver either in support of an appeal of an adjudication under Act 142 or, prospectively, by petitioning DPW in the manner provided by the GRAPP. To the extent a provider seeks a waiver by petition it is not seeking review of an adjudication pursuant to Act 142 and therefore the scope of such a petition cannot be limited by a regulation that implements Act 142.

Moreover, there is no basis in law or policy for DPW’s attempt to force providers to request a hearing following nearly every action by DPW and to seek waiver requests, or find themselves forever barred from petitioning DPW for a waiver. Proposed rule 41.41(c) will almost certainly result in a flood of otherwise unnecessary appeals by providers seeking waivers that they might never need. Absent proposed rule 41.41(c), providers might not appeal adjudications of relatively minor import, even if they believe that they are entitled to a waiver of the regulation upon which DPW relied. Weighing the costs and benefits, providers might be willing to allow many actions to become final without litigation. If proposed rule 41.41(c) is adopted as proposed, however, providers will be forced to appeal every action that implements a regulation, if there is some possibility that the provider may want to petition for a waiver of that regulation in the future.
Fifth, the proposed rules create a process for handling waiver requests that do receive BHA consideration, despite the provisions designed to frustrate such consideration, that is inconsistent with Act 142. Proposed rule 41.191(b), in part, provides: "If a request for a hearing includes a waiver request, the Bureau will make a written recommendation for consideration by the Secretary proposing that the waiver be either granted or denied and stating the Bureau’s reasoning in support of its position." Proposed rule 41.191(b) thus builds on Proposed Rule 41.5 (jurisdiction of the Bureau) by attempting to create a process inconsistent with Act 142.

Under Act 142, the BHA is obligated to "conduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider" and to "issue a determination adjudicating contested issues of facts and law and any appropriate order, decree or decision." 67 Pa.C.S §§ 1102(E)(2)(VII) & 1105(A). The BHA's determination is then subject to review by the Secretary in the manner provided. 67 Pa.C.S. § 1105(B).

Act 142, by its plain terms, does not provide for or anticipate a special process for handling waiver requests that are made by providers in support of an appeal filed with BHA. There is, therefore, no legal basis for proposed section 41.191(b). Consequently, this section should be deleted so that waiver requests presented in connection with a timely appeal will be considered and resolved in the same manner as all other factual and legal issues raised by a provider in an appeal.

In a similar vein, proposed rule 41.213 outlines the process by which the Secretary reviews "recommendations" with respect to waiver requests heard by BHA in support of an appeal. As discussed above, Act 142 does not allow for differential treatment of waiver requests submitted in support of an appeal. Rather, BHA must issue a "determination" with respect to a waiver request if the availability of a waiver is an issue presented in a request for hearing. 67 Pa.C.S § 1105(A). BHA, in other words, is not empowered to make "recommendations" in the manner contemplated by proposed rule 41.213. As a result, this proposed rule is superfluous and should be deleted to avoid confusion and misunderstanding.

Sixth, the proposed rules apparently seek to deprive providers of the ability to their right to have BHA conduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider, 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E)(2)(VII). Proposed rule 41.43 states: "The sole means by which a provider may formally petition the Department for the issuance, amendment or deletion of a regulation or statement of policy is by filing a petition for relief." The intent of this proposed rule is unclear but, in any event, it should be deleted.

To the extent proposed rule 41.43 purports to limit BHA's ability to rule on the validity of a regulation, it conflicts with Act 142 by attempting to limit BHA's authority to conduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider. To the extent the proposed rule purports to address petitions for relief and not appeals of actions as authorized by Act 142, it is beyond the scope rulemaking authority conferred by Act 142. In either case, therefore, proposed section 41.43 should be deleted.
Seventh, the proposed rules deprive providers of their right to *de novo* review by preventing BHA from issuing final determinations on the merits of issues "properly raised" in petitions for relief. In particular, proposed rule 41.5(c) states: "The Bureau has no jurisdiction to issue a final determination on the merits of an issue properly raised in a petition for relief." A "petition for relief" is defined, in the proposed rules, as consisting of a petition filed under the GRAPP asking the Department to, among other things, issue, amend, waive or delete a regulation or otherwise seeking declaratory relief. Among the issues that could be raised in a petition for relief, therefore, is a challenge to the validity of a regulation. Accordingly, proposed rule 41.5(c) could be interpreted as precluding BHA from issuing a final determination on the merits of a challenge to all, or part of, a DPW regulation.

To the extent a provider challenges the validity or applicability of a DPW regulation in connection with its appeal of an adverse decision by DPW, then BHA has an obligation to issue a final determination resolving the issue presented, irrespective of whether or not the same issue could have been raised in a petition for relief. See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E)(2)(VII). BHA’s final determination is subject to review by the Secretary in the manner provided for by Act 142. See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1105(B).

Because issues that could be raised by a petition for relief (as defined in the proposed rules) might also be raised by a provider seeking review of an adverse decision by DPW, proposed section 41.5(c) should be modified to provide: "Other than in connection with issues raised by providers in a timely filed request for hearing, the Bureau has no jurisdiction to issue a final determination on the merits of an issue properly raised in a petition for relief."

Eighth, the proposed rules improperly restrict a provider’s ability to seek declaratory relief before BHA. Proposed rule 41.31(d)(4)(iii) provides: "A provider may not request a declaratory order or an order that the Department should be required to promulgate, amend or repeal a regulation as relief in a request for hearing. The requests shall be set forth in a petition for relief in accordance with 1 Pa. Code § 35.18 (relating to petitions for issuance, amendment, waiver or deletion of regulations)."

As discussed above in connection with proposed rule 41.5 (jurisdiction of the Bureau), Act 142 does not provide, or allow for the restriction on the scope of hearings suggested by proposed section 41.31(d)(4)(iii). To the extent declaratory relief (in the form of an order declaring a DPW regulation invalid, for example) constitutes an "appropriate order" in a given appeal, then BHA is obligated to provide such relief. See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1105(A). Although such an order may be ancillary to an order invalidating agency action taken based on the invalidated regulation, it is nevertheless an appropriate order. At the same time, however, it is equally clear that Act 142 does not authorize BHA to order DPW to adopt a regulation. In this regard, BHA, as intended,  

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1 To the extent a provider seeks to compel DPW to perform a quasi-legislative act, such as adopting a regulation, it should proceed by petition filed with the Secretary. In such a case, the provider would not be seeking review of an individualized decision of the Department regarding the Medicaid program. Such petitions, therefore, are beyond the scope of Act 142.
functions like a court in that it has the power to rule on the validity of regulations but not the power to order DPW to adopt regulations.

Ninth, the proposed rules alter the nature of proceedings based on petitions for relief and declaratory relief that exceed the scope of Act 142. Proposed rule 41.42 addresses requests for declaratory relief included in petitions for relief. As discussed above, petitions for relief filed other than as part of a request for a hearing following an adjudication by DPW are not addressed in or governed by Act 142. Rather, such petitions are addressed in, and governed by, the GRAPP. Moreover, Act 142 does not authorize DPW to modify the GRAPP applicable to petitions for relief. Accordingly, proposed rule 41.41, in its entirety, should be deleted for purposes of the now pending proposed rulemaking.

Taken individually, these nine concerns constitute a list of proposed regulatory provisions clearly inconsistent with the dictates of Act 142. Taken together, they confirm that the proposed regulations improperly deny providers their right to \textit{de novo} review of all factual and legal issues guaranteed in Act 142.

\section*{B. The Proposed Rules Improperly Shift the Burden of Proof to Providers in all Cases}

Proposed rule 42.153(a), in part, provides: “The provider has the burden of proof to establish its case by a preponderance of evidence and is required to make a prima facie case by the close of its case-in-chief.” A rule that imposes the burden of proof on providers in all cases is inconsistent with Act 142 and with the common law in Pennsylvania governing the allocation of the burden of proof. Accordingly, proposed rule 41.153(a) should be modified to allocate the burden of proof in a manner consistent with Pennsylvania law as routinely restated by the courts and as evidenced by the practice before other Commonwealth agencies. See, e.g., 25 Pa. Code § 1021.122 (allocating the burden of proof in connection with hearings before the Environmental Hearing Board).

Act 142 directs BHA to “[c]onduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider in the request for hearing based on evidence presented to the Bureau.” Inherent in this mandate is a requirement for a fair hearing before an impartial hearing body. One component of a fair hearing, and one indicia of impartiality, is the proper allocation of the burden of proof. For example, in a case where DPW has accused a provider of fraud or other misconduct, the provider would be denied a fair and impartial hearing if DPW can force the provider to attempt to prove the negative. This, however, would be the result if proposed 42.153(a) were adopted.

The law with respect to the proper allocation of the burden of proof could not be clearer. “The fundamental principle is that the burden of proof in any cause rests upon the party who as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case asserts the affirmative of an issue. . . . One alleging a fact which is denied has the burden of establishing it.” \textit{Lincoln Intermediate Unit v. Bermudian Springs School Dist.}, 441 A. 2d 813, 815 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (indication of quotation omitted); \textit{see also Zenner v. Goetz}, 188 A. 124 (Pa. 1936) (“It is a well-recognized principle of evidence that he who has the positive of any proposition is the party called upon to offer proof of
it. It is seldom, if ever, the duty of a litigant to prove a negative until his opponent has come forward to prove the opposing positive.”) Moreover, the Commonwealth Court has expressly recognized that the burden of proof in proceedings before BHA is allocated in accordance with general rule quoted above. See South Hills Health System v. DPW, 510 A.2d 934, 935 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) [“The [provider] contends, and we agree, that one who asserts the existence of certain facts bears the burden of proving them.”]; see also 36 Standard Pa. Practice 2d, § 166.183 (“In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof generally rests with the party asserting the affirmative of any issue.”)

Nothing in Act 142 purports to change settled case law. Accordingly, proposed rule 41.153(a) must be revised to properly allocate the burden of proof. With some modification necessary to reflect the types of actions taken by DPW, as compared to actions taken by the Department of Environmental Protection, we believe that the rule adopted by the Environmental Hearing Board provides an excellent model that is consistent with precedent cited above. See 25 Pa Code § 1021.122.

Proposed section 41.153 should therefore be revised to read:

(a) In proceedings before the Bureau, the burden of proceeding and the burden of proof shall be the same as at common law in that the burden shall normally rest with the party asserting the affirmative of an issue. It shall generally be the burden of the party asserting the affirmative of the issue to establish it by a preponderance of evidence. In cases where a party has the burden of proof to establish a party’s case by a preponderance of evidence, the Bureau may nonetheless require the other party to assume the burden of proceeding with the evidence in whole or in part if that party is in possession of facts or should have knowledge of facts relevant to the issue.

(b) The Department has the burden of proof in the following cases:

(1) When it assesses a penalty or imposes a sanction on a provider.

(2) When it seeks to recoup or recover an alleged overpayment to a provider.

(3) When it revokes or suspends a license, permit, approval or other authorization.

(4) When it issues an order to a particular provider.

(c) A provider appealing an action of the Department shall have the burden of proof in the following cases:

(1) When the Department denies a license, permit, approval or other authorization.
(2) When the Department denies or reduces a payment to the provider for reasons other than a claim of provider misconduct or fraud.

(3) When a provider to whom a license, approval, authorization or financial allocation is issued protests one or more aspects of such issuance.

On a related note, proposed rule 41.181 tracks the proposed rule allocating the burden of proof in all cases to providers and requires that, in all cases, providers file the first post-hearing brief. Because the rule allocating the burden of proof must be revised to comply with the law, proposed rule 41.181 also should be revised to provide that the party with the burden of proof shall file the first post-hearing brief.

C. The Provisions Governing Expedited Disposition Must Be Modified

Proposed rule 41.92 identifies certain types of appeals that BHA will process in accordance with expedited pre-hearing procedures. The apparent justification for this rule is to allow DPW and providers to continue the established practice of resolving certain appeals using a more informal process than that specified in the proposed rules. Proposed rule 41.92 allows parties to seek to opt out of the expedited procedures, for good cause shown. See proposed rule 41.92(g).

For the reasons set forth below, proposed rule 41.92 should be revised to allow parties to "opt into" (rather than seek to opt out of) the expedited procedures upon stipulation by the parties or upon motion with good cause shown. If revised as recommended, rule 41.92 will preserve the ability of DPW and providers to resolve certain appeals using an informal or expedited process while also protecting the rights created and secured by Act 142.

By forcing certain types of appeals to be resolved using DPW's expedited process irrespective of the scope and circumstances surrounding a given appeal, proposed rule 41.92 eviscerates a provider's right to a fair hearing under Act 142. In this manner, proposed section 41.92 conflicts with Act 142 by arbitrarily limiting the rights of providers and by imposing additional burdens solely on providers, to the extent providers appeal one or several types of actions taken by DPW.

Among the rights arbitrarily cut off by proposed rule 41.92 is a provider's right to conduct "reasonable and necessary discovery." See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E)(2)(V); see also proposed rule 41.92(f)(9) (discovery not allowed in connection with appeals identified in proposed rule 41.92). While a provider and DPW might agree that discovery is unnecessary in a given case, a rule that automatically precludes discovery, or that forces a provider to obtain leave in order to conduct discovery, is inconsistent with Act 142.

Providers that appeal the types of actions identified in proposed rule 41.92 also will be denied advance notice of the evidence to be presented by DPW at a hearing, thus depriving providers of the fair and impartial hearing anticipated by Act 142. Pursuant to proposed rule 41.92, DPW is
not required to file a pre-hearing position paper disclosing its witnesses, evidence and legal theories. See proposed rule 41.92(f)(8). By contrast, under proposed section 41.92, providers must continue to provide full disclosure to DPW through comprehensive hearing requests. See proposed rule 41.92(b)(1). Moreover, if an appeal comes within the scope of proposed rule 41.92, providers must also file “[r]elevant supporting documentation” with their hearing requests, thus ensuring that DPW has notice of the evidence providers will rely on at the expedited hearings. See proposed rule 41.92(b)(2). This unbalanced and inequitable approach to certain types of appeals is inconsistent with the mandate of Act 142.

Moreover, mandatory application of the proposed expedited hearing procedures is not justified by a desire to allow parties to continue to resolve certain types of appeals in an informal manner. Parties may continue to resolve appeals informally, either through settlement discussions or by opting in to the expedited procedures.

The solution is to revise proposed rule 41.92 to limit its application to appeals where the parties agree to proceed in the manner set forth therein or where a party by motion demonstrates to BHA that the expedited procedures should apply.

D. The Provisions Concerning Supersedeas are Inconsistent with Act 142

Proposed rule 41.53(b) provides: “A supersedeas will not be issued if injury to the public health, safety or welfare exists or is threatened during the period when the supersedeas would be in effect. If State law or Federal law or regulation require that an action take effect prior to the final determination of an appeal, injury to the public health, safety or welfare shall be deemed to exist.”

The second sentence of proposed rule 41.53(b) should be deleted as inconsistent with 67 Pa.C.S. § 1103(B) and as unlawfully limiting BHA’s power to consider all relevant circumstances when determining whether a supersedeas should issue to protect an innocent provider from arbitrary and unlawful agency action that threatens to cause irreparable harm. The effect of the second sentence of proposed rule 41.53(b) is to make it impossible for BHA to comply with the statutory mandate that, when considering a request for supersedeas, it “shall be guided by relevant judicial precedent.” 67 Pa.C.S. § 1103(B). As proposed, rule 41.53(b) usurps BHA’s authority to act in accordance with judicial precedent by mandating that BHA deny a supersedeas even where a provider has proven at a hearing that: (i) it is likely to prevail on the merits; (ii) it will suffer irreparable harm; and (iii) there is no likelihood of injury to the public or other parties.

Not only does the second sentence of proposed rule 41.53(b) preclude BHA from satisfying the mandate of Act 142, it fails to serve a valid public purpose. The public interest is protected by 67 Pa.C.S. § 1103(C), which provides: “A supersedeas shall not be issued if injury to the public health, safety or welfare exists or is threatened during the period when the supersedeas would be in effect.” BHA, and the Commonwealth Court upon review, will apply this standard and protect the public interest. Consequently, the public interest is not advanced, and in any given case
might actually be harmed, by the proposed mandatory finding that the public is threatened in cases where the evidence available to BHA clearly establishes otherwise.

In sum, if a provider has proven that the public will not be injured if a supersedeas is issued, the fact that the statute or regulation at issue (which BHA must preliminarily conclude DPW misapplied) states that an action taken pursuant thereto shall take effect prior to any appeal should not provide a basis for denying a supersedeas and forcing a provider to suffer irreparable harm. The second sentence of proposed rule 41.53(b) should be deleted.

E. The Provisions Governing Chapter 275 May Conflict with Act 142

Proposed rule 41.1(c) provides: "This chapter does not apply to appeals governed by Chapter 275 (relating to appeal and fair hearing and administrative disqualification hearings)." Proposed rule 41.1(c) is either unnecessary or in conflict with Act 142. In either case, the proposed language should be deleted.

As a general rule, Chapter 275 governs appeals by beneficiaries not providers. See Northwestern Institute of Psychiatry v. Department of Public Welfare, 513 A.2d 495 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986). To the extent a recipient brings an appeal under Chapter 275, the appeal would be beyond the scope of the proposed rules because proposed rule 41.1(a) provides: "This chapter governs the practice and procedure in MA provider appeals." Thus, to the extent Chapter 275 does not apply to appeals commenced by Medicaid providers, the additional exclusion in proposed rule 41.1(c) is unnecessary and its existence will only result in confusion and uncertainty as persons attempt to give meaning to an unnecessary provision.

At the same time, to the extent Chapter 275 could, in some circumstances, apply to an appeal brought by a provider that "is aggrieved by a decision of the Department regarding the program," then Act 142 does not authorize a categorical exclusion of such appeals from the scope of the rules governing provider appeals. In this case, proposed rule 41.1(c) should be deleted as inconsistent with the statutory authorization under which it is promulgated.

II. The Proposed Rules are Fundamentally Unfair to Providers

A. The Scope of Proposed Rules Unfairly Denies Interested Parties the Right to Comment

Proposed rule 41.1(b) provides: "In addition to this chapter, [the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure ("GRAPP") and other applicable Departmental regulations apply to the practice and procedures in MA provider appeals, except as specifically superseded in relevant sections of this chapter." This provision unfairly incorporates by reference unspecified Departmental regulations, and this reference should be stricken.

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2 It should be noted that, by letter dated March 31, 2003, PHCA offered detailed comments concerning the SPO. One of our comments addressed this concern. We remain dismayed that those comments largely have been ignored in the proposed rules as promulgated.
This reference was not in BHA’s previously issued Standard Practice Order and was not presented to or considered by the advisory committee constituted pursuant to 67 Pa.C.S. § 1106(B). Moreover, if imported into the new rules of procedure, DPW’s existing regulations (and, presumably, subsequently issued regulations) may interfere with the right of providers to obtain de novo review of DPW decisions in the manner, and to the extent, expressly provided for in Act 142. For example, 55 Pa. Code § 1101.84(d) lists certain “nonappealable actions.” Precluding appeals in certain cases conflicts with Act 142, which states: “A provider that its aggrieved by a decision of the Department regarding the program may request a hearing before the bureau in accordance with this chapter.” 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(A). Similarly, 55 Pa. Code § 1187.141 purports to limit the scope of, and to impose additional restrictions on, appeals brought by nursing facilities in a manner that conflicts with Act 142’s mandate that BHA “[c]onduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider in the request for hearing based on evidence presented to [BHA].” 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E)(2)(VII).

The ambiguous cross-reference to other applicable regulations effectively denies interested parties a meaningful opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations. It is impossible for an interested party to determine whether DPW or another party will, in the future, take the position that a particular regulation is “applicable” to provider appeals before BHA. It also is impossible for interested parties to determine the actual scope and substance of the regulations now available for comment. As a result, to the extent DPW proposes to incorporate existing regulations, these regulations should be identified with specificity and a revised proposed rule published for comment and for review by the Independent Regulatory Review Commission.

Finally, in addition to creating a conflict between DPW’s existing regulations and the mandate of Act 142, the cross-reference to unidentified “other applicable Departmental regulations” is certain to result in disagreement with respect to whether or not existing or future DPW regulations are “applicable” to appeals commenced pursuant to Act 142.

B. Notice Requirements are Unfair to Providers

Proposed rule 41.21(a)(3) authorizes DPW to provide notice of agency action by publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin if the action applies to a class of providers or makes system-wide changes affecting more than a single provider. “Agency action” is defined, in the proposed rules, as including an “adjudicative action of the Department.” Thus, under proposed rule 41.21(a)(3), DPW appears to be authorized to give notice of adjudicative actions adversely affecting individual providers in a manner that gives rise to a right to a hearing under Act 142 merely by publishing notice in the Pennsylvania Bulletin if the adjudicative action happens to apply to more than a single provider. Proposed rule 41.21(a)(3) is inconsistent with the intent of Act 142 and should be deleted.

Once again, PHCA raised this concern in its letter dated March 31, 2003 concerning the SPO.
DPW should not be permitted to give notice by publication of "adjudicative actions" that are of the type that give rise to a right of appeal under Act 142 unless, and until, it has attempted to provide written notice to the provider. If an action by DPW "aggrieves" an individual provider within the meaning of 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(A), such that the provider is entitled to a hearing, then the provider is entitled to receive written notice of the action. See proposed rule 41.31(b) ("A provider is aggrieved by an agency action if the action adversely affects the personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities, or obligations of the provider."). Irrespective of whether or not an adjudicative action by the Department applies to more than one provider, proper and effective written notice is an essential element of a fair and impartial de novo hearing mandated by 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E)(2)(VII). Consequently, proposed section 41.21(a)(3) should be deleted.

In addition, proposed rule 41.31(e), in pertinent part, provides: "If the provider received written notice of the agency action by publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, the provider shall identify the date, volume and page number of the Pennsylvania Bulletin in the request for hearing." Here as well, DPW should not be permitted to provide notice of actions subject to appeal before the BHA by publishing notice of such actions in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. Actions that are subject to appeal under Act 142 are adjudicatory actions that adversely affect individual providers, although it is possible that DPW might take an action that adversely affects more than one provider. DPW should be required to provide individual written notice of such actions. As a result, the portion of proposed section 41.31(e) quoted above is superfluous and should be deleted to avoid unnecessary disputes.

**C. Pleading Requirements are Unfair to Providers**

A number of proposed rules concerning pleadings are deeply unfair to providers. First, providers must plead with detailed specificity or risk dismissal with prejudice, while DPW not only may avoid pleading with specificity, it may avoid pleadings altogether. Proposed rule 41.31(d)(2) states that a request for a hearing must include "[d]etailed reasons why the provider believes the agency action is factually or legally erroneous." Proposed rule 41.31(d)(3) states that a request for a hearing must also include an "[i]dentification of the specific issues that the provider will raise in its provider appeal." Either these proposed rules must be amended to eliminate the extensive pleading burdens imposed on providers or proposed rule 41.71(a) must be amended to require DPW to answer hearing requests. See proposed § 41.71(a) ("An answer to a pleading is not required."); see also proposed § 41.3 (defining "pleading" as a "request for hearing").

As a matter of fundamental fairness and due process of law, there is no basis for requiring only one of two parties to a de novo proceeding before BHA to file what amounts to a fact-pleading similar in nature and specificity to a complaint or answer filed in state court. If a provider is required to file such a pleading, then DPW should be required to file a like pleading. In the alternative, proposed rules 41.31(d)(2) and (d)(3) should be amended to allow providers to generally state their objections to the DPW action at issue, to be followed by a more specific
enumeration of the grounds for appeal in the position paper filed pursuant to proposed section 41.112. See Pa.R.A.P. 1513(a) (content of petition for review).  

The following example illustrates the unfairness and prejudice inherent in proposed rules 41.31(d)(3) and (d)(4). Under these proposed rules, when a provider commences an appeal, it must file and provide DPW with a detailed explanation of the factual and legal basis for the appeal. In fact, under proposed rule 41.32(d), a provider waives all factual and legal objections and issues that are not raised in either a request for a hearing or an amended request for a hearing. DPW, on the other hand, need not make an equivalent disclosure to the provider until it files its pre-hearing position paper, which is not due until well after the close of discovery and after it has received the provider’s position paper and any expert reports. See proposed rule 41.112(b). As a result, DPW will be able to focus its discovery, expert analysis and position paper on the theories and facts disclosed in the provider’s request for hearing while the provider will be forced to use the limited discovery available under the proposed rules to try unearthing the factual and legal basis for DPW’s action.

There are two ways to eliminate the bias and prejudice introduced by proposed rules 41.31(d)(3) and (d)(4). The first option is to replace the requirement that a request for a hearing enumerate specific factual and legal objections and claims with a requirement that a request for a hearing identify general objections to the DPW action at issue known to the provider at the time the request for a hearing is filed or amended. A model for such an approach is Rule 1513(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that a petition for review shall include “a general statement of the objections to the order or other determination” subject to review.

The second, preferable - - and in light of Act 142 - - arguably, mandatory option is to require both parties to file full pleadings at the outset of an appeal. Although frequently characterized as “appeals,” proceedings before BHA are not appellate in nature. Rather, consistent with Act 142, proceedings before BHA are like proceedings before a trial court, in that BHA is obligated to conduct a de novo hearing and to make determinations based on evidence presented to it. See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E)(2)(VII). As a result, it is inappropriate to employ an appellate model, whereby parties typically are not required to “answer” petitions for review. It is even more problematic to apply the appellate model to one party (DPW) and to apply trial court pleading requirements to other parties (providers). In other words, it is inappropriate to require providers to file complaints that DPW does not have an obligation to answer.

On a related note, proposed rule 41.71(a), which concerns DPW’s answer to a request for hearing, also must be modified. This proposed rule states: “An answer to a pleading is not required.” As defined in the proposed rules, a “pleading” is a request for a hearing. Proposed rule 41.71(a) thus provides that DPW need not answer requests for hearings.

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4 On a related note, proposed rule 41.82, in pertinent part, provides that a request for a hearing may not be amended except as specified in proposed rules 41.32(c) and 41.33(b). Given the text of proposed rules 41.32(c) and 41.33(b), proposed rule 41.82 is superfluous and should be deleted to avoid confusion and uncertainty.
Fundamental fairness certainly demands that, if providers are obligated to file hearing requests that are nearly identical in scope and detail to complaints filed in state court (as proposed rule 41.31 appears to suggest), then DPW should be obligated to answer hearing requests in the same way that a defendant answers a complaint. Proceedings before BHA must be conducted in an equitable manner and the rules of procedure should not provide either party an unwarranted procedural advantage. It is clear, however, that by forcing one party, but not the other, to disclose the factual and legal bases of its claims, the proposed rules introduce significant bias and partiality into proceedings before BHA.

Act 142 contemplates a fair process. There is no justification for forcing providers to disclose the facts and legal theories upon which they rely at the outset of an appeal -- or face waiver of claims and issues not clearly raised or even dismissal -- while allowing DPW to avoid a similar disclosure until after discovery is complete and until after providers have prepared their expert reports and filed their position papers. Similarly, there is no justification for forcing providers, but not DPW, to use the discovery process to identify the facts that are truly in dispute and the legal points on which the parties actually differ. It is wasteful and inefficient to proceed in this manner.

A better process would be to compel DPW to answer provider allegations and contentions so that the parties are similarly situated with respect to their ability to engage in thoughtful, focused discovery and pre-hearing preparation. This can be accomplished by revising proposed rule 41.71(a) to require that DPW must answer hearing requests with the same degree of specificity required of providers. By doing so, DPW and providers would be placed on equal footing and discovery would then be conducted in a more efficient and focused manner.

A less efficient, but still fairer, alternative would be to allow providers to preserve issues and claims by way of general objections to the action subject to appeal. If DPW is able to avoid complete and binding articulation of its position until it files a position paper after the close of discovery, then providers should be afforded similar flexibility, without the need to seek special relief from BHA. In sum, for the process to be fair, and for the mandate of Act 142 to be satisfied, DPW and providers should be treated as equals throughout the entire process. In this manner, parties to hearings before BHA would be placed in positions similar to plaintiffs and defendants in proceedings in court and the right to a de novo hearing before the BHA will be preserved.

Second, the proposed provisions governing amendment or withdrawal of pleadings also potentially interferes with provider rights. Proposed rule 41.25(b) provides: “A party may withdraw a legal document by filing a motion for leave to withdraw the document. The motion will be granted or denied by the Bureau as a matter of discretion.” This proposed rule may be interpreted as interfering with the right of a provider to withdraw its appeal [see proposed rule 41.83(a)(1)] and will result in unnecessary motion practice before BHA. Parties to proceedings before BHA should be able to withdraw any and all filings at any time without seeking leave to do so. In this regard, there are no standards for BHA to apply if asked to rule on a request to withdraw a filing. Nor are there standards for a court to apply if asked to review a decision by BHA either granting or denying a request to withdraw a filing. In sum, proposed rule 41.25(b)
serves no purpose other than to impose additional obligations on BHA and to create unnecessary motion practice, could be interpreted as improperly impinging on provider rights and therefore should be stricken.

Third, the proposed rules unduly restrict the ability of providers to amend requests for a hearing. Proposed rule 41.32(c)(2)(ii) states that a provider may amend a request for hearing more than 90 days after filing if the amendment is based on additional information acquired after the 90-day period that contradicts information previously disclosed by DPW or that provides entirely new information not previously disclosed by DPW. This right to amend is conditioned by subsection (B), however, upon establishing that DPW will not be prejudiced if the amendment is allowed.

There is no justification for precluding an amendment that might prejudice DPW where the amendment results from the discovery of information that either contradicts information previously disclosed by DPW or consists of information that was not previously disclosed by DPW. The rules of practice should not operate to reward DPW for failing to provide full and accurate disclosure of all relevant information. Yet this is the result of proposed rule 41.32(c)(2)(ii)(B), because DPW almost certainly will be able to articulate a claim of some prejudice when a provider seeks to amend a request for hearing outside of the 90-day period. Accordingly, proposed rule 41.32(c)(2)(ii)(B) should be deleted.

Fourth, the expedited pre-hearing procedures are potentially prejudicial to providers. Proposed rule 41.92 identifies certain types of appeals that BHA will process in accordance with expedited pre-hearing procedures. The apparent justification for this rule is to allow DPW and providers to continue the established practice of resolving certain appeals using a more informal process than that specified in the proposed rules. Proposed rule 41.92 allows parties to seek to opt out of the expedited procedures, for good cause shown. See proposed rule 41.92(g).

Proposed rule 41.92 should be revised to allow parties to “opt into” (rather than seek to opt out of) the expedited procedures upon stipulation by the parties or upon motion with good cause shown. If revised as recommended, proposed rule 41.92 will preserve the ability of DPW and providers to resolve certain appeals using an informal or expedited process while also protecting the rights created and secured by Act 142.

By forcing certain types of appeals to be resolved using DPW’s expedited process irrespective of the scope and circumstances surrounding a given appeal, however, proposed rule 41.92 eviscerates a provider’s right to a fair hearing under Act 142. In this manner, proposed rule 41.92 conflicts with Act 142 by arbitrarily limiting the rights of providers and by imposing additional burdens on providers (but not on DPW), to the extent providers appeal one or several types of actions taken by DPW.

Among the rights arbitrarily cut off by proposed rule 41.92 is a provider’s right to conduct “reasonable and necessary discovery.” See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E)(2)(V); see also proposed rule 41.92(f)(9) (discovery not allowed in connection with appeals identified in § 41.92). While a provider and DPW might agree that discovery is unnecessary in a given case, a rule that
automatically precludes discovery, or that forces a provider to obtain leave in order to conduct discovery, is inconsistent with Act 142.

Providers that appeal the types of actions identified in proposed rule 41.92 also will be denied advance notice of the evidence to be presented by DPW at a hearing, thus depriving providers of the fair and impartial hearing anticipated by Act 142. Pursuant to proposed rule 41.92, DPW is not required to file a pre-hearing position paper disclosing its witnesses, evidence and legal theories. See proposed § 41.92(f)(8). By contrast, under proposed rule 41.92, providers must continue to provide full disclosure to DPW through comprehensive hearing requests. See proposed rule 41.92(b)(1). Moreover, if an appeal comes within the scope of proposed rule 41.92, providers must also file "[r]elevant supporting documentation" with their hearing requests, thus ensuring that DPW has notice of the evidence providers will rely on at the expedited hearings. See proposed rule 41.92(b)(2). This unbalanced and inequitable approach to certain types of appeals is inconsistent with the mandate of Act 142.

Moreover, mandatory application of the proposed expedited hearing procedures is not justified by a desire to allow parties to continue to resolve certain types of appeals in an informal manner. Parties may continue to resolve appeals informally, either through settlement discussions or by opting in to the expedited procedures.

The solution is to revise proposed rule 41.92 to limit its application to appeals where the parties agree to proceed in the manner set forth therein or where a party by motion demonstrates to BHA that the expedited procedures should apply.

Finally, the provisions governing petitions to intervene are unduly narrow. Proposed rule 41.61 provides that petitions to intervene may not be filed later than 60 days from the filing date on the provider’s request for a hearing, except upon good cause shown. This proposed rule appears inconsistent with 1 Pa. Code § 35.30, which provides that petitions to intervene may be filed at any time unless an order fixing an earlier deadline has been entered in a particular case. To avoid confusion, proposed rule 41.61 should be revised expressly to be consistent with 1 Pa. Code § 35.30.

D. Disclosure and Discovery Provisions are Unfair to Providers

The provisions governing disclosure and discovery also contain a number of provisions unduly favoring DPW’s interests and unduly undermining providers’ interests. First, providers must disclose the names of all persons having knowledge of the facts and circumstances at issue, while DPW need only disclose the names of its witnesses. In particular, proposed rule 41.111(b)(1), in part, provides that DPW must disclose the identity of “officials or staff designated to testify on its behalf.” This requirement should be revised to compel DPW to disclose the identity of “each individual likely to have discoverable information, identifying the subjects of the information.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).

While parties to proceedings before BHA are certainly interested in, and entitled to know, the identity of persons to be called as witnesses against them, for purposes of discovery parties also
should know the identity of persons who are likely to have discoverable information. It is the people who have discoverable information (who may or may not be called as witnesses), that the party is most interested in deposing. Moreover, in a typical proceeding, a party will not call as witnesses everyone who has discoverable information. To the contrary, a party may, for strategic reasons, affirmatively decide not to call a particular person as a witness, even though that person might have the most complete understanding and knowledge of the relevant facts. Thus, by requiring disclosure of witnesses, but not of all persons with relevant knowledge, proposed rule 41.111(b)(1) does not further the objective of a full and fair hearing on the merits.

In addition, it is unreasonable to require DPW merely to identify witnesses while simultaneously requiring providers to identify “each person who provided facts, opinions or other information that were relied upon in drafting the request for hearing,” proposed rule 41.111(c)(1). Act 142 offers no basis for such a distinction. Accordingly, disclosures mandated by section 41.111 should be coextensive, thus helping to ensure the fair and impartial hearing anticipated by Act 142. In order to achieve this end, proposed rules 41.111(b)(1) should be revised based on the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A).

Second, provisions governing mandatory disclosures are unfair to providers. Proposed rule 41.111(f) provides that a party cannot take discovery until it has made the mandatory disclosures enumerated in proposed rule 41.111. The last sentence of proposed rule 41.111(f) states: “A provider whose initial mandatory disclosure identifies documents in the possession of the Department of program office, but fails to provide copies of the provider’s own record or documents in support of one or more issues raised in the provider’s request for hearing, will not be in compliance with this subsection.”

This provision is inconsistent with proposed rule 41.111(c)(2) and imposes unwarranted obligations on providers but not on DPW. Proposed rule 41.111(c)(2) provides for disclosure of documents by either providing copies of relevant documents or by describing the categories and identifying the location of relevant documents. Similarly, DPW may satisfy its disclosure obligations by describing the categories and identifying the location of relevant documents. See proposed rule 41.111(b)(2). Proposed rule 41.111(f), however, changes the rule, but only with respect to providers, by forcing providers to provide DPW with copies of documents in the provider’s possession.

There is no reasonable basis for compelling one party, but not the other, to provide copies of documents as part of initial disclosures. If providers must furnish DPW with copies of documents, then DPW should be obligated to furnish providers with copies of documents.

More importantly, in a given case, it may be absurd to preclude a provider from conducting discovery unless, and until, the provider gives DPW copies of documents to support issues raised in the provider’s notice of appeal. For example, under proposed rule 41.111(f), a provider would

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5 Indeed, proposed rule 41.111(c)(1) also should be modified consistent with the language of Fed. R. Civ. P 26(a)(1)(A).
be unable to conduct discovery if the issues it raised in its request for hearing are such that the provider does not have any relevant documents in its possession.

On a related note, provisions governing documents protected from disclosure should be modified. Proposed rules 41.111(b)(2) and 41.111(c)(2) require disclosure of relevant documents. Both except from disclosure documents “privileged or protected from disclosure.” To ensure that the discovery proceeds in an orderly manner, parties should be obligated to identify documents withheld from disclosure under a claim of privilege or protection. Early articulation and resolution of claims of privilege will allow parties to complete discovery within the time allowed by the proposed rules and will also serve as check on misplaced claims of privilege. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5), modified as necessary to reflect the context of proposed rule 41.111, should be incorporated as follows: “When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under this rule by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing the information itself that may be privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.”

Third, in addition to allowing DPW to avoid disclosure of persons with relevant knowledge, the proposed rules unduly restrict a provider's ability to depose DPW staff members. Proposed rule 41.120(b) provides: “Unless the Secretary has been identified as a witness by the program office, a party may not depose the Secretary.” There is no basis in law for a rule that would automatically preclude the deposition of the Secretary if he or she is likely to have knowledge of discoverable information and if such a deposition is otherwise within the scope of discovery, as governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Fundamental fairness demands that DPW be obligated to disclose the identity of persons with discoverable information, not just persons identified as witnesses. If the Secretary is identified as a person with discoverable information, then a provider is entitled to depose the Secretary, provided, of course, that the request is otherwise reasonable and not made for improper purposes. See proposed rule 41.119(b) (discovery otherwise governed by Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4011 (“Limitations of Scope of Discovery and Deposition”) adequately protects the Secretary and others from unwarranted depositions. Rule 4011 provides that a deposition shall not be permitted if, among other things, the deposition either: (a) is sought in bad faith; or (b) would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense to the deponent or any person or party. Moreover, any party may seek a protective order if an unwarranted deposition is sought. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 4012.

As discussed throughout these comments, there being no legal justification for a different result, the rules governing appeals before BHA must treat providers and DPW as equals. In this regard, the Secretary is similarly situated to the Chief Executive Office of a large, corporate provider. The rules do not purport to automatically protect a provider's CEO from deposition and, therefore, should not automatically protect the Secretary from deposition. Rather, the need for depositions of senior executives should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis subject, of course,
to the limitations found in, and sanctions available under, the governing rules of civil procedure. As a result, proposed rule 41.120(b) should be deleted.

Proposed rule 41.120(c) similarly requires modification. This proposed rule attempts to limit the extent to which providers may depose “senior Department officials.” As discussed above, if a senior DPW official is likely to have discoverable information then, subject to the rules of procedure governing discovery, the senior DPW official should be obligated to appear for deposition.

Fourth, the proposed provisions governing position papers are prejudicial to providers. Proposed rule 41.112 directs the parties to file pre-hearing position papers. Providers will file their position papers first, and then DPW may file its position papers up to 60 days later.

As a matter of fundamental fairness, there is no justification for a general rule that compels providers to file position papers in advance of DPW. Rather, the order in which position papers are to be filed should depend on the allocation of the burden of proof, with the party that would bear the burden of proof at common law (i.e., the party asserting the affirmative of a proposition) being obligated to file first. In the alternative, the parties should file their position papers at the same time and then each party should be permitted to supplement its position paper, but only to the extent it is necessary to do so in order to rebut matters raised in the other party’s filing.

In connection with de novo proceedings before independent tribunals and the courts, issues with respect to the order in which position paper or similar pre-trial statements are filed are intertwined with issues regarding the allocation of the burden of proof. In the proposed rules, rule 41.112 apparently reflects proposed rule 41.153, which imposes the burden of proof on providers in all cases. As discussed separately, it is contrary to law to impose the burden of proof on providers in all cases and proposed rule 41.153, therefore, should be revised to follow settled law. Consequently, proposed rule 41.112 also must be revised to address appeals wherein DPW bears the burden of proof. If DPW bears the burden of proof, then DPW should file its position paper first.

The revisions to proposed rule 41.112 necessary to reflect a proper allocation of the burden of proof can be accomplished by replacing subsections 41.112(a) and (b) with a requirement that the party with the burden of proof (as per a revised rule 41.153) file and serve its position paper within 60 days of the close of discovery and that the other party file its position paper 60 days later. An alternative equitable approach would be to require the parties to file their position papers at the same time. Simultaneous exchange, with an opportunity for limited supplementation, eliminates bias in the process.

Proposed rules 41.112(a) and (b) should also be revised to impose equivalent sanctions on both DPW and providers for any failure to file position papers. If a provider fails to file and the sanction is automatic dismissal then the provider’s appeal should be automatically sustained if DPW fails to file. There is, in other words, no justification for allowing DPW to proceed to hearing if it fails to file a position paper while at the same time dismissing a provider’s appeal if it fails to file its position paper.
Finally, the proposed provisions limiting discovery upon consolidation of appeals are unfair to providers. Proposed rule 41.81(j) states: “If the Bureau grants a provider’s motion to consolidate, the discovery available to the providers in the consolidated appeals must, in the aggregate, comply with the limitations specified in § 41.120 (relating to limitations on the scope of discovery).” Because proposed rule 41.81(c) provides that consolidation will not be appropriate if it will prejudice the ability of the nonmoving party to perform discovery, proposed rule 41.81(j) should be revised to limit the discovery available to both providers and DPW upon consolidation. If a collection of appeals involves issues that give rise to the need for discovery directed at individual providers by DPW, then DPW should object to consolidation on the basis that its ability to conduct necessary discovery will be impeded. Once appeals are consolidated, however, all parties should be entitled to the same discovery, unless the Bureau directs otherwise for good cause shown.

E. Artificial Limitations on BHA’s Authority Prejudice Provider Interests

The proposed rules also impose artificial limitations on BHA’s discretionary authority that redound to the detriment of providers. In particular:

- **Proposed Rule 41.32(f):** This proposed rule purports to divest BHA of its inherent discretion by providing that the BHA “will dismiss a request for hearing . . . if the following conditions are met” (emphasis added). BHA’s inherent authority should not be limited unnecessarily by regulations that compel it to dismiss or limit an appeal without consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances. BHA’s authority to dismiss an appeal when the circumstances warrant can be clearly established by stating that BHA “may” dismiss appeal under certain circumstances. It is therefore unnecessary, and inappropriate, to mandate that BHA “will” dismiss an appeal under certain circumstances.

- **Proposed Rule 41.83(b):** This proposed rule provides: “When a provider appeal is withdrawn prior to adjudication, the withdrawal shall be with prejudice.” To preserve BHA’s independence, it is important to avoid the use of mandatory language or to otherwise expressly recognize BHA’s inherent authority to depart from the rules of procedure where there is good cause to do so. Accordingly, proposed rule 41.83(b) should be revised to recognize this inherent authority. This can be accomplished by amending rule 41.83(b) to read: “When a provider appeal is withdrawn prior to adjudication, the withdrawal shall be with prejudice unless otherwise indicated by the Bureau.” See 25 Pa. Code § 1021.141(b) (governing withdrawal of appeals filed with Environmental Hearing Board).

- **Proposed Rule 41.32(e):** This proposed rule purports to divest BHA of its inherent discretion by providing that the BHA “will dismiss a request for hearing . . . if a provider fails to file its request in accordance with the time limits specified in subsection (a)” (emphasis added). Once again, BHA’s inherent authority should not be limited unnecessarily by regulations that compel it to dismiss or limit an appeal without
consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances. BHA’s authority to dismiss an appeal when the circumstances warrant can be clearly established by stating that BHA “may” dismiss appeal under certain circumstances. It is therefore unnecessary and inappropriate to mandate that BHA “will” dismiss an appeal under certain circumstances.

Proposed Rule 41.32(d): This proposed rule provides in part: “A general objection to an agency action shall be deemed a failure to object and shall constitute a waiver of the objections and issues relating to an action.” The provision is overly broad and inappropriately divests BHA of its inherent discretion. This provision should either be deleted or substantially rewritten.

As proposed, this rule appears to state that a provider that includes a general objection in a request for a hearing actually waives all objections, including those presented with sufficient specificity. Assuming that this is not the intent behind the provision, the text should be revised to eliminate any uncertainty.

More importantly, it is unreasonable and inappropriate to use the mandatory “shall” to force BHA to rule that providers that raise “general objections” have, in all cases, waived all objections and issues. In order for BHA to carry out its responsibilities under Act 142, it must be authorized to consider all relevant circumstances, including the conduct and knowledge of DPW, when determining whether a provider has waived objections and issues. Under Act 142, the BHA is to operate as an independent tribunal and conduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider in a request for a hearing. See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1102(E). BHA cannot fulfill its statutory mandate if it lacks the authority commonly vested in independent tribunals or if its inherent authority is effectively limited by regulation.

To avoid unnecessarily limiting BHA’s authority, proposed rule 41.32(d) should be revised to replace “shall” with “may.” A revised rule 41.32(d) would provide BHA with clear authority to find waiver when the circumstances warrant, without unnecessarily limiting BHA’s discretion.

III. The Proposed Rules Require Greater Clarity

There are a number of proposed rules that should be clarified to avoid confusion. In particular:

Proposed Rule 41.2: This proposed rule, which governs overall construction and application, is incomplete in that it fails to provide BHA with authority to waive strict compliance with the proposed rules. Although it could be argued that BHA has the inherent authority to waive compliance with its rules when appropriate, as other state agencies have done, the better approach is to expressly provide such a right. See 25 Pa. Code § 1021.4. Accordingly, proposed rule 41.2(a) should be amended to add: “The Bureau at every stage of a proceeding before it may disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantive rights of the parties.”
Proposed rule 41.5(e): This proposed rule provides: "The Bureau has no jurisdiction in a provider appeal involving an agency action if Federal law or Federal regulations require the aggrieved provider to use Federal appeal procedures in order to contest the agency action." This proposed rule is unnecessary and should be deleted to avoid confusion.

Under Act 142, Medicaid providers are entitled to a hearing before BHA if they are aggrieved by a decision by DPW regarding the Medicaid program. Thus, on its face, Act 142 does not apply to actions taken by federal agencies that would be appealed pursuant to federal appeal procedures. Accordingly, to the extent proposed rule 41.5(e) is intended to address appeals by Medicaid providers of actions taken by federal agencies, it is unnecessary and should be deleted to avoid confusion and potential litigation.6

Proposed Rule 41.14(a): This proposed rule provides: "A pleading or legal document that contains an averment of fact not appearing of record or that contains a denial of fact must be verified as specified in subsection (b)." This section should be clarified to eliminate a latent ambiguity. As written, proposed rule 41.14(a) requires a verification if a legal document (such as a brief) contains a denial of fact, even if the denial is otherwise supported by evidence in the record. This result will be eliminated if proposed rule 41.14(a) is revised to read: "A pleading or legal document that contains an averment or denial of fact not supported by evidence in the record must be verified as specified in subsection (b)."

Proposed Rule 41.15(c): This proposed rule provides that documents filed with BHA are available for inspection and copying, except to the extent information therein is protected from disclosure. It fails, however, to provide a process by which protected information will be identified and redacted. Proposed rule 41.15(c) should be amended to provide such a process.

As drafted, this proposed rule appears to require BHA staff to review all documents prior to providing public access in order to determine whether the documents contain protected information. BHA staff should not bear this burden. Rather, parties submitting documents to the BHA should be instructed to redact all protected information (such as patient information) before filing documents with the BHA or serving documents on other parties. To the extent confidential information must be considered by the BHA in order to resolve a dispute, then any documents filed with the BHA containing such information should be filed under seal. In this manner, all documents filed with the BHA, other than documents filed under seal, will be immediately available for public inspection and copying.

To accomplish the foregoing, proposed rule 41.15 should be revised as follows. In addition, proposed rule 41.15(d) should be renumbered as 41.15(f), in order to accommodate the following revisions.

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6 In the alternative, to the extent that proposed section 41.5(e) is intended to address matters other than appeals of actions by federal agencies, the types of appeals to which this section applies should be specified.
(c) Documents filed with the Bureau, other than documents filed under seal in the manner provided below, are available for inspection and copying at the Bureau's offices.

(d) Except as provided below, persons filing documents with the Bureau must first redact all information protected by law from disclosure.

(e) To the extent a party concludes that it is necessary to provide the Bureau with information that is otherwise protected by law from disclosure, the party should make its filing under seal and should separately bind, label and file documents containing such protected information.

➤ **Proposed Rules 41.113 and 41.114:** Both proposed rules 41.113 and 41.114 are incomplete in that they fail expressly to supersede the inconsistent requirements of 1 Pa. Code §§ 35.164 and 35.165. Section 35.164 addresses the submission into evidence of documents on file with agency and section 35.165 addresses the submission of “public documents,” such as official reports, decisions or opinions of executive departments and legislative agencies. By allowing certain documents to be received into evidence without actually being physically offered at a hearing, these provisions of the GRAPP are inconsistent with the requirements of proposed sections 41.113 and 41.114, in that the proposed rules require parties to file and provide the other party with copies of all documents to be submitted as evidence. As a result, proposed rules 41.113 and 41.114 should be revised either expressly to supersede or expressly to be consistent with 1 Pa. Code §§ 35.164 & 35.165 or to expressly to be consistent with

➤ **Proposed Rule 41.117:** Proposed rule 41.117 provides that, at a hearing, a party will not be permitted to offer the testimony of witnesses, or offer documents, not identified in the party's position paper. Consistent with practice before courts and other agencies conducting de novo hearings, proposed rule 41.117 should be revised to clarify that this rule applies only to a party's case-in-chief and not to rebuttal testimony or documents used solely for impeachment.

➤ **Proposed Rule 41.122:** Proposed rule 41.122(a) should be revised to insert the word “or” between “ordered by the Bureau” and “if the party learns.” As currently drafted, this provision appears to obligate parties to supplement responses only if ordered to so do by the Bureau.

➤ **Proposed Rule 41.132:** Proposed rule 41.132 should be revised to expressly supersede the part of 1 Pa. Code § 35.180(a) that states: “A presiding officer may refer any motion to the agency head for ultimate determination.” Such a referral before determination by BHA, as would appear to be authorized by the GRAPP, would be inconsistent with Act 142. See 67 Pa.C.S. § 1105.
Proposed Rule 41.161: Proposed rule 41.161(a) allows for written testimony in lieu of oral testimony. This allowance for written testimony appears inconsistent with 1 Pa. Code § 35.137, which allows written testimony only with respect to expert witnesses. In order to avoid confusion, proposed rule 41.161(a) should be revised to expressly supersede 1 Pa. Code § 35.137.

* * * * * * * *

In conclusion, PHCA firmly believes that the proposed rules are inconsistent with Act 142 and other key requirements of Pennsylvania law, articulate a procedural framework that denies providers fundamental fairness in contravention of the letter and intent of Act 142 and contain ambiguous provisions that require greater clarity. We urge substantial modifications to the proposed rules before they are issued as final regulations.

Thank you in advance for considering our comments and recommendations. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions regarding this submission.

Very truly yours,

Alan G. Rosenbloom
President and CEO

AGR/jlh

cc: Honorable Harold F. Mowery, Jr.
Honorable Vincent J. Hughes
Honorable George T. Kenney, Jr.
Honorable Frank L. Oliver
September 13, 2004

Randy J. Riley, Administrative Law Judge
Department of Public Welfare
2330 Vartan Way, Second Floor
Harrisburg, Pa 17110

Dear Mr. Riley:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Proposed Regulation #14-488 (#2416), Medical Assistance Provider Appeal Procedure, Department of Public Welfare, 55 PA Code Chapter 41. Pennsylvania Community Providers Association represents more than 150 community mental health, substance abuse and mental retardation service providers in Pennsylvania. As such, the association is very interested in a fair and timely process for Medical Assistance hearings and appeals. Comments are provided on the Proposed Rulemaking found in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, Volume 34, Number 33, dated August 14,2004. Comments are provided by section with a brief restatement of the proposed rule, followed by the comments.

§ 41.1 Scope
(b) "In addition to this chapter, GRAPP and other applicable Departmental regulations apply to the practice and procedures in MA provider appeals, except as specifically superceded in relevant sections of this chapter."

The phrase "other applicable Department regulations" should be deleted as being too broad and all encompassing. Other regulations may conflict and may serve to limit remedies available to providers.

§ 41.5 Jurisdiction of the Bureau.
(b) "The Bureau has no jurisdiction to make a final determination on a waiver request included in a request for hearing."
(c) "The Bureau has no jurisdiction to issue a final determination on the merits of an issue properly raised in a petition for relief."

These requirements excessively limit the jurisdiction of the Bureau and should be deleted.
§ 41.21 Notice of agency actions.
(a)(3) "By publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin if the agency action applies to a class of providers or makes system-wide changes affecting more than a single provider."

Regardless of the number of providers affected, the provider(s) who request the hearing should receive individual notice of any agency action.

§ 41.32 Timeliness and perfection of requests for hearing.
(d) "...A general objection to an agency action shall be deemed a failure to object and shall constitute a waiver of the objections and issues relating to an action."

If a provider raises specific issues, and also includes a general objection to requirements, it appears that this negates all of the issues raised related to that action. This language should be revised to clarify that issues presented with sufficient specificity are not invalidated.

§ 41.53 Circumstances affecting grant or denial.
(b) "A supercedeas will not be issued if injury to the public health, safety or welfare exists or is threatened during the period when the supercedeas would be in effect. If State law or Federal law or regulation require that an action take effect prior to the final determination of an appeal, injury to the public health, safety or welfare shall be deemed to exist."

The first sentence of this section addresses consideration for public health, safety and welfare. The second sentence is superfluous for this consideration and also serves to unduly limit the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

§ 41.112 Filing of position paper.
(a) "...If the provider fails to meet the position paper due date or fails to supply the Bureau with the required documentation, the Bureau will dismiss the provider's appeal."
(b) "...If the program office fails to meet the position paper due date, the Bureau will schedule the case for hearing and will notify the Chief Counsel of the Department."

The standards should be the same for both the provider and the program.

§ 41.117 Penalties for noncompliance.
(a) "A party will not be permitted to offer the testimony of a witness at a hearing on a provider appeal unless either the party disclosed the identity of the witness in the party's position paper or the party establishes that there is good cause to permit the testimony of the witness."
It must be clear that "good cause" to permit the testimony of a witness not identified in the party's position paper includes instances such as the death of an identified witness, or that the identified witness is no longer employed by the party but another individual functions in that capacity.

§ 41.171 Independence
(a) "The presiding officers will act independently of employees or public officials of the Department whose actions are subject to review before the Bureau."
(b) "The presiding officers may not engage in ex parte communications concerning a hearing with a party to the hearing."

What oversight is provided to assure compliance with these provisions? What sanctions will be applied for noncompliance?

Although it was noted in specific sections above, a general concern throughout this proposed rulemaking is that standards should be equivalent for providers and programs. In several instances it appears that standards are more stringent for providers. Please contact Betty Simmonds of my staff if you have questions regarding these comments.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

George J. Kimes
Executive Director
Pennsylvania Community Providers Association
george@paproviders.org

cc: IRRC
Re: Comments on behalf of the Pennsylvania Association of Resources for People with Mental Retardation ("PAR") to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Issued by the Department of Public Welfare and Published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin on August 14, 2005

Dear Judge Riley:

On March 31, 2003, the Pennsylvania Association of Resources for People with Mental Retardation ("PAR") submitted comments regarding the standing practice order issued by the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals that was published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin on March 1, 2003. I enclose a copy of those comments.

Many of the questions raised in PAR's comments were answered by publication of the Final Standing Practice Order in the Pennsylvania Bulletin on June 29, 2003 and by the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin on August 14, 2004. Nonetheless, it is our belief that an important issue remains unanswered regarding whether the processes contained in the Proposed Rulemaking will apply to resolved disputes brought by Medical Assistance providers and others who operate programs under waivers to the Medical Assistance Program.

For example, a provider or others who provide services to individuals eligible for those services under the Consolidated Waiver (of the Pennsylvania Medical Assistance Plan) whose services are funded with Medical Assistance funds that are administered through various county MH/MR offices, may have cause to bring a dispute before the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals. This could occur when the Department has made a determination that is adjudicative in nature, such as when specific costs are determined to be unallowable based upon an audit conducted by the Bureau of Financial Operations of the Department.
Clarification of the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals to resolve disputes described by this example would be very useful to those providers and others who operate such programs.

In addition, as previously provided in our comments of March 31, 2003 with regard to Position Papers, PAR continues to emphasize that the disparity in sanctions that may be applied to providers as opposed to those that may be applied to the Department should be reconsidered. While those sanctions may prompt providers to redouble their efforts to ensure compliance with each procedural requirement, the Department is not under the same procedural threat of sanction. Consequently, the Department may not move as readily to respond in a timely fashion to those requirements. As both parties to any dispute need to act appropriately and timely in responding to the requirements of these rules in order to make the system operate most efficiently, PAR suggests that the Bureau consider imposing the same sanctions upon the Department as have been proposed for application to providers pursuant to the proposed rules.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. Please feel free to contact me if you should have further questions.

Sincerely,

Shirley A. Walker
President and CEO
March 31, 2003

Thomas Cheffins, Director
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
Department of Public Welfare
2330 Vartan Way, 2nd Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17110-9721

Re: Comments by the Pennsylvania Association of Resources for People with Mental Retardation (PAR) on the Draft Standing Practice Order Issued by the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals Published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin on March 1, 2003

Dear Mr. Cheffins,

The Pennsylvania Association of Resources for People with Mental Retardation (PAR) thanks the Department of Public Welfare for the opportunity to provide written comments on the above referenced Standing Practice Order.

PAR is a statewide association whose members provide the full range of supports and services to individuals with mental retardation in over 3,000 locations in the Commonwealth in addition to numerous non-residential and in-home supports.

PAR submits the following comments to the proposed Standing Practice Order:

Filing an Appeal.

1. Rules 6 and 19. Under the Standing Practice Order, will the Bureau utilize the thirty (30) day timeframe for the filing of provider appeals found in several appeals regulations, e.g., 1101.84(a),(b),(c), 6210.123 or 6211.33(b) or the timeframes provided at 67 Pa. C.S. § 1103(B)?

2. Rule 5. Will the appeals procedure under the Standing Practice Order be utilized to resolve disputes brought by providers that operate under waivers to the Medical Assistance program?

3. Rule 6. Will the Bureau accept the filing or amendment of appeals by facsimile transmission or by any other form of electronic transmission?
4. **Rule 7.** What forms of submission, e.g., hard copy, facsimile transmission, email transmission, will be deemed to constitute a written motion for the purpose of requesting an extension of time?

**Rule 32 Expedited Disposition Procedure for Certain Appeals**

Although this procedure is helpful for the type of appeals listed in paragraph (a), why would an expedited appeals process not also include terminations or suspensions of medical assistance provider status which, because such hearings are held only after the effective date of the termination, ordinarily will have a greater impact on the provider than those listed in paragraph (a)?

**Rule 35(c) Position Papers**

1. Under the Standing Practice Order, Rule 35(c)(1), the provider is to supply the Bureau with what is described as “required documentation.”

   (a) Does “required documentation” used in this section mean only those items referenced under Rule 35(c)(3) regarding the contents and amendments to position papers or some other documentation, and, if other documents, what is that documentation?

   (b) Why is no corresponding demand made upon the program office to submit “required documentation” with its position paper?

2. Under the Standing Practice Order, if the provider does not meet its position paper due date or supply the required documentation referenced above, the Bureau will dismiss the appeal; however, if the program office fails to meet its position paper due date, the Bureau will schedule the case for [from] hearing and will notify the Chief Counsel of the Department. This disparity in the proposed process raises several questions:

   (a) Why does the Bureau propose such a huge disparity in the sanction be applied to the parties simply based upon their status as provider or program office?

   In raising this question, we recognize that under the provisions of this rule regarding Penalties for Noncompliance, a party shall not be permitted to offer testimony or exhibits at a hearing that were not identified in its position paper filed with the Bureau. However, application of these sanctions to the program office appear to be either alternatively ineffective or inefficient because the rule may allow the program office to do one of two things the provider is not permitted to do:

   1. The program office could file and serve its position paper late because no timeframe is provided in the penalties paragraph. If this were allowed, the provider’s ability to prepare and present its case would be prejudiced, but the program office could entirely avoid the imposition of the sanction. This would make the sanction ineffective, but only as to the program office.
2. If the provisions of Rule 6 requiring the timely filing of all pleadings and legal
documents would eliminate a late filing by the program office, the program
office would not have its position denied and the appeal decided against it as
occurs to the provider. The matter would go forward, but would be a very
inefficient use of time in that the program office has no ability to offer any
testimony or exhibits.

(b) What is the purpose in holding a hearing in which the decision must be based
upon the preponderance of the evidence pursuant to Rule 47, but the program
office cannot present a case?

(c) As the provider need establish only a prima facie case by the close of its case-in-
chief, and the program office cannot proceed to its case at hearing, would it also
not be more practical to hold both parties, the provider and the program office,
accountable under the same sanction for the same failure?

Rule 36(4) Deposition of the Secretary and Senior Department Officials

1. As the agency actions frequently are signed by the Deputy Secretary or a Bureau director,
why include these individuals in the group that may not be deposed without the
application of the listed findings?

2. How would a party determine whether the senior department official has knowledge
which is not privileged, unless the provider has the opportunity to ask him or her?

3. How would a party determine whether the senior department official has knowledge that,
even if shared with a subordinate official or employee, caused the senior department
official to take the agency action he or she signed and sent to the provider, unless the
provider has the opportunity to ask him or her?

Rule 44 Voluntary Mediation

67 Pa. C.S. § 1102(F) provides for the establishment of programs and procedures to promote
settlements or to narrow issues through mediation and arbitration. The proposed rule establishes
a procedure for mediation. Will another rule or procedure be proposed to establish a procedure
for arbitration?

We welcome your questions and are available to meet with you at any time regarding our
comments. Thank you for giving our comments your thoughtful consideration.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Shirley A. Walker
President and CEO
September 13, 2004

Department of Public Welfare
Randy J. Riley
Administrative Law Judge
2330 Vartan Way
Second Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17110

Dear Mr. Riley:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. PANPHA is a statewide association of more than 330 non-profit senior service providers, including nursing homes. PANPHA reviewed and provided comments on the Standing Practice Order on March 31, 2003 and we note that two revisions we suggested were made to the proposed regulation. PANPHA staff and Financial Issues Committee members reviewed the proposed regulation #14-488 published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin (34 Pa.B. 4447) on August 14, 2004 and have the following comments.

1. 41.3 Definitions - “Senior Department Official” is defined too broadly. Eliminate “…an individual who works in the office of the Secretary or who reports directly to the Secretary, including…”

2. 41.5 Scope - Delete sections (b) and (c) because they limit the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

3. 41.31 Request for Hearing - Delete “Detailed” from 41.31 (d)(2). This provides the Bureau with the ability to review requests much too subjectively. In addition, add a provision for a protective request for a hearing to file a request for a hearing to preserve its right to contest a disputed agency action at a time when it can not have all of the information it needs to decide whether the issue is worth pursuing.

4. 41.111(f) Disclosures - does not place the same burden on the Department regarding the initial mandatory disclosure that is placed upon the provider. The regulation should hold the Department to the same standard required of providers.

5. 41.112 (a) and (b) Position Papers - If the Department fails to meet a timeframe for filing a position paper, the result should be the same as the result for a provider that fails to meet a timeframe. That is, if the program office fails to meet the position paper due date, the Bureau should recommend ruling in the provider’s favor. At a minimum, the must be a mechanism to ensure that if the Department fails to meet its time obligation for the position paper, the provider must be given adequate time to review the Department’s position paper before a hearing is scheduled.
6. **41.171 Independence** – PANPHA members question what oversight there is to assure compliance with this provision. What are the sanctions for noncompliance?

7. **41.153 – Burden of Proof and Production** – The burden of proof should not be on the provider at all times, but instead be on the Department when it imposes a penalty or seeks another action against a provider and on the provider when appealing Departmental action.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,

W. Russell McDaid
V.P. Public Policy
russ@panpha.org

cc: John Jewett, IRRC
November 29, 2004

Department of Public Welfare
Attention: Randy J. Riley,
Administrative Law Judge
2330 Vartan Way (Second Floor)
Harrisburg, PA 17110

BY FAX AND U.S. MAIL

RE: WRITTEN COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Our Matter No. 377-03

Dear Judge Riley:

This supplements our written comments, suggestions and objections to the Proposed Regulations to focus on an ambiguity and incorrect presumption in Proposed Rule 41.25(c) ("Subsections (a) and (b) supersede 1 Pa. Code §§ 33.41, 33.42 and 33.51 (relating to amendments; withdrawal or termination; and docket)).

In the Proposed Regulations at Rule 4.1(b), the Department indicates that GRAPP continues to apply except as “specifically superseded in relevant sections”. Section 41.25 deals with the amendment and withdrawal of legal documents, while 1 Pa. Code § 33.51 deals with docketing in a section separated by a different caption from 1 Pa. Code § 33.41 and 33.42, dealing with the amendment and withdrawal of pleadings. The inclusion of 1 Pa. Code § 33.51 in Proposed Rule 41.25(c) appears to be an error based on the incorrect presumption that it deals with the amendment and withdrawal of legal documents, which it does not. Since the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of Proposed Rule 41.25 (relating to amendment or withdrawal of legal documents) do not specifically relate to any term or language in 1 Pa. Code § 33.51 (relating to docket), Proposed Rule 41.25(c) can have no application to 1 Pa. Code § 33.51 in any case and the reference to § 33.51 in the Proposed Rule should be deleted.

In addition, we submit that there is no rational basis for the Department to supersede 1 Pa. Code § 33.51 (docket) since all other Commonwealth agencies, as well as the Pennsylvania Courts, have either adopted the regulation or a separate regulation with the same language. See, for example: 1 Pa. Code 17.102; 7 Pa. Code § 131.17; 25 Pa. Code § 1021.39; 37 Pa. Code § 171.13; 52 Pa. Code § 1.86; 58 Pa. Code §§ 183.452,
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185.72; 61 Pa. Code § 901.402; Pa. R.A.P. 907 (all relating to docket). Public access to such docketing information has been the public policy of the Commonwealth and should continue to be for MA Provider Appeals under the new rules.

Thank you for this opportunity to provide the Department with our comments, suggestions and objections to these Proposed Rules.

Best wishes to you and your colleagues for this Holiday Season.

Very truly yours,

CAPOZZI & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

cc: Robert E. Nyce, Executive Director, IRRC
September 7, 2004

Department of Public Welfare
Attention: Randy J. Riley,
Administrative Law Judge
2330 Vartan Way (Second Floor)
Harrisburg, PA 17110

RE: WRITTEN COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Our Matter No. 377-03

Dear Administrative Law Judge Riley:

We are responding to the Department’s invitation to provide our written comments, suggestions, and objections to the proposed rulemaking published at 34 Pa.B. 4447, on August 14, 2004, concerning implementation of Medical Assistance Provider Appeal Procedures pursuant to Act 142-2002 (the Act), 67 Pa. C.S. § 1106(A). Our Firm participates on the Advisory Committee established by the Act, 67 Pa. C.S. § 1106(B), and previously made recommendations that were adopted by that Committee. Our comments, suggestions and objections to the proposed rules are as follows:

1. **General Concern:** The Department’s Proposed Rules adopt many of the procedures utilized by the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB), which was established by Congress to hearing Medicare Provider reimbursement disputes (42 U.S.C. 1395oo). While the PRRB’s operating procedures have worked well over many years, they are designed for provider appeals that focus on questions of reimbursement, while Act 142 requires the Department to provide a forum other kinds of matters as well. We are concerned that the Proposed Rules have been biased by the Department’s concern with the large number of reimbursement appeals brought by nursing facility providers and do not result in a forum designed to independently and de novo hear other kinds of provider matters. This bias is most particularly present in Proposed Rule 41.153 (relating to burden of proof), in which the Department, contrary to recommendations of the Advisory Committee required by Act 142, and also contrary to all of its prior practice, proposes to place the burden of proof on providers in all cases. This proposal is inconsistent with the allocation of burden of proof in every other
provider forum, including federal agencies that deal with exactly the same kinds of
matters included within Act 142. While the burden of proof is on the provider in matters
before the PRRB, where the matters involve exclusively questions of providers’
justifying claims for additional reimbursement, such an allocation of the burden of proof
is inappropriate in many other kinds of matters, as we discuss further below. This
“reimbursement appeal bias” permeates the Department’s entire approach to establishing
procedures and results in anomalies throughout when dealing with matters other than
reimbursement appeals. We suggest that the Department amend these Proposed Rules to
eliminate the “reimbursement appeal bias” by providing more flexibility for the Bureau
of Hearings and Appeals to deal with other kinds of cases, especially cases involving
penalties or sanctions.

2. Cross References. The Proposed Rulemaking includes a statement under the
heading “Cross References” and at § 41.1(b) that: “The GRAPP and other applicable
Department regulations apply to the practice and procedures in MA provider appeals,
except as specifically superseded in relevant subsections of the proposed rulemaking.”
The Proposed Rulemaking includes subsections that only specifically supersede sections
of the GRAPP. The Proposed Rule at § 41.2, relating to Construction and application,
do not provide for conflicts between the provisions of the Act, provisions of the
Proposed Rule, and “other applicable Department regulations.” This may be the result
of the Bureau’s conclusion that there are no “other applicable Department regulations”
that apply to the practice and procedure in MA appeals. This omission should be
corrected in the rulemaking process in order to avoid litigation and abuse and to clarify
which, if any other Department regulations the Bureau has determined apply in addition
to the Proposed Regulations. For example, the Act plainly intended to supersede and
does supersede the time limits for filing appeals contained in 55 Pa. Code §§ 1101.84
and 1187.141. In addition, the Act permits an aggrieved provider to request a hearing on
any decision of the Department regarding the Medical Assistance Program (67 Pa. C.S.§
1102(A)), including not only those permitted by 55 Pa. Code § 1187.141, but also those
precluded by 55 Pa. Code § 1187.141. The Proposed Rulemaking should clarify, for
example, whether providers are required to exhaust the “Exception Process” in 55 Pa.
Code § 1101.68 prior to challenging the Department’s rejection of an invoice for
payment and when the time to appeal begins in such cases.

3. Preserving Appellate Review. The Proposed Rulemaking at § 41.214
advises that a provider aggrieved by a final adjudication of the Department issued under
§ 41.212(a) (relating to a Bureau determination as to which the provider does not seek
review by the Secretary) may file for judicial review under the Administrative Agency Law. The Act (67 Pa. C.S. § 1105(A)) expressly provides that a determination “not appealed in accordance with subsection (b)” (relating to review by the Secretary) is not only the final determination of the Bureau but that it shall also be “binding upon the Department and the provider who brought the appeal”. This provision of the Act indicates the intent of the Legislature to require a provider to seek review by the Secretary as a perquisite to preserving issues for further review pursuant to the Administrative Agency Law. The Act makes the Bureau’s determination “binding upon” both parties unless review by the Secretary is sought pursuant to 67 Pa. C.S. § 1105(B). The Act makes the review process a step in the “appeal” process (67 Pa. C.S. § 1105(A) (“a determination not appealed in accordance with subsection (b)....”). A provider that fails to seek review may be deemed under this language in the Act not to have exhausted its administrative remedies as required to preserve issues for judicial review. Compare: 42 CFR § 405.1871(b)(relating to decisions of the PRRB)(“The decision of the Board...shall be final and binding upon all parties to the hearing before the Board unless it is reviewed by the Secretary...or revised [by reopening]; where the regulatory scheme provides for administrative review whether or not sought by a party and the statute expressly permits judicial review whether further administrative review is sought or not) and § 405.1877 (relating to judicial review); 1 Pa. Code § 35.241 (relating to reconsideration).

The language in the Act that permits judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Agency Law for providers aggrieved by a final determination of the Bureau as well as a final Order of the Secretary (67 Pa. C.S. § 1105(C)), refers to final determinations of the Bureau for which review was sought under subsection (b) but, as to which, the Secretary did not enter a final Order (67 Pa. C.S. §§ 1105(B)(2), 1105(B)(4)). See also: Shaulis v. State Ethics Commission, 739 A.2d 1091 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (When agency’s decision leaves no other forum in which to assert rights, agency’s act is “adjudication” subject to judicial review by way of appeal); Philadelphia County Medical Society v. Kaiser, 699 A.2d 800 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (Only when those administrative appeals have been exhausted will agency action become adjudication subject to judicial review). Where, as here, the Legislature has expressly provided that providers must seek review to prevent the Bureau decision from becoming binding, the statutory mandate is a prerequisite for appellate review. Such a construction is consistent with the Legislature’s 180-day limitation of the Secretary’s jurisdiction to act in the review process (§§ 1105(B)(3,4)), which was designed to assure that the administrative appeal process, as a whole, would not be open-ended and would permit timely judicial review.
4. Extensions of Time, Amendments, Waiver, and Reopening. The Proposed Rules properly recognize in § 41.201 (relating to reopening) that justice requires reopening and consideration of material evidence previously unavailable to a party through the exercise of due diligence. The problem is that the Proposed Rules do not afford a complete remedy in such cases or, at least, that they appear to include rules that would prevent a complete remedy. While the Proposed Rules provide for amendments nunc pro tunc (Rule 41.33), a complete remedy appears to be in conflict with the limits on introducing documents not included in position papers as evidence (Rules 41.116-41.117(b)); for example, there is no “good cause” exception in Proposed Rule 41.117(b), similar to that in 41.117(a). The time-limited preclusion of a “good cause” exception to amend a position paper in Proposed Rule 41.116, conflicts with the need for a complete remedy in reopening situations and with the rationale of the reopening process; and, that limitation should be amended to provide that a reopening situation is an exception to that exception – we suggest as follows: “...except that no amendment to a position paper will be permitted within 30 days of the commencement of the hearing in the provider appeal, but may be permitted thereafter for good cause shown pursuant to § 41.201 (relating to reopening of record prior to adjudication) or a party’s failure to timely supplement responses made to discovery”. Proposed Rule 41.32(c)(2) (relating to permitted amendments to a request for hearing), should also provide for the additional exception of evidence qualifying under the reopening rule without any requirement that prejudice be considered. The inclusion of evidence resulting from reopening is required to cure deemed waivers of issues required by § 41.32(d). Providers should be permitted to revive legal or factual objections where relevant material evidence is later found.

In support of our point, we remind the Department that it has on occasion believed that documents relevant to a matter did not exist, only to remember something about them during testimony at a hearing and locate and produce them prior to the final adjudication of the matter. In such a case, the provider, at a minimum, should be afforded an opportunity for a complete remedy of any prejudice resulting from the delay in disclosure by the Department in order to assure the due process, which Act 142 requires.

5. Withdrawal With Prejudice. The Proposed Rules provide at § 41.83(b) that a voluntary withdrawal of an appeal prior to adjudication “shall be with prejudice”. Since this proposal is contrary to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a), which provide that such a dismissal is ordinarily without prejudice, the Bureau should reconsider the Proposed Rule. We suggest that the Proposed Rule be amended to read as follows: “When a provider appeal is withdrawn prior to adjudication, the Bureau shall
issue a notice to the parties that the appeal has been withdrawn and that the Bureau is closing its record on the appeal. A provider that has withdrawn an appeal may refile within the time limits provided by law."

6. **Supersedeas.** The Act expressly directs the Department (§ 1103(B)) to be guided in determining whether the grant or deny a Supersedeas “by relevant judicial precedent”, listing three (3) factors to be considered. In the Proposed Rules at § 41.53(b), however, the Department establishes an irrebuttable presumption that injury to the public health, safety, or welfare “shall be deemed to exist” whenever State law or Federal law or regulation require that an action take effect prior to the final determination of an appeal. No provision of the Act, nor any relevant judicial precedent is cited as the basis for adding this presumption. The Department should strike this presumption from the Proposed Rule as inconsistent with the mandate of the Act that the Department be guided by relevant judicial precedent in determining supersedeas petitions. In addition, the use of the “will” in the Proposed Rule (“The Bureau, in granting or denying a supersedeas, will be guided....”) is inconsistent with the Legislature’s use of “shall” in the Act (“The Bureau, in granting or denying a supersedeas, shall be guided....”). The Department is not authorized by the Act to promulgate regulations that alter the intent and meaning of the Act, only to promulgate regulations establishing rules of procedure as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act (§ 1106(A)). The Legislature knew when it passed the Act how to require the kind of presumptive effect proposed by the Department (e.g., 71 P.S. § 745.6(b), now repealed, precluded IRRC from issuing a supersedeas order to stop implementation of proposed regulations required to implement federal laws or regulations). The Act provides the Department with complete guidance as to the criteria to be applied in supersedeas matters; and, therefore, no further regulations are required. Relevant judicial decisions permit the Bureau to weigh the impact of granting relief on “the public interest”, in addition to the criteria specifically identified in the Act. See: Commonwealth v. Martorano, 535 Pa. 178, 634 A.2d 1063 (1993). By proposing the presumption, the Proposed Rule alters the criteria, which are to guide the Bureau pursuant to the Act and limits the flexibility given by the Act to the Judiciary and not to the Department to define or change precedent.

7. **Burden of Proof and De Novo Review.** The Act requires the Bureau to conduct de novo review of all factual and legal issues raised by a provider in a request for hearing (§ 1102(E)(2)(VII)). Proposed Rule 41.153 (relating to burden of proof and production) is inconsistent with this mandate and should be amended to place the burden on proof on the Department in certain kinds of cases where the Department has
previously had that burden: for example, in cases involving allegations of overpayment, violation of Program regulations, imposition of sanctions or penalties, and termination of provider agreements. This issue was discussed during the Advisory Committee process where we presented proposals and argument on this issue on November 7, 2003. We continue to believe that changes are essential to comply with the Act and Due Process. In our November 7, 2003 correspondence addressed to you, we noted:

"De novo review contemplates an independent evaluation of the evidence already presented. See: Two Sophia’s, Inc. v. PLCB, 799 A.2d 917 at FN 5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). In conducting an administrative hearing, BHA is GIVING FULL CONSIDERATION TO THE QUESTION ANEW AS IF IT WAS NEVER HEARD BEFORE AND NO DECISION HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY ENTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT. BHA SUBSTITUTES ITSELF FOR THE PRIOR DECISION-MAKER AND REDECIDES THE CASE, IN ITS ORIGINAL AND NOT IN ANY APPELLATE JURISDICTION. See: Millcreek Manor, Inc. v. DPW, 796 A.2d 1020, 1029 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Given the Legislature’s embrace of DE NOVO REVIEW in Act 142, the burden of proof language is inconsistent with the intent of the Act and prior case law construing the de novo review process.

[The] Rule...should be amended to require the agency to have the burden of proof and making a prima facie case where it alleges fraud or willful misconduct by a provider or an overpayment to a provider, and to read as follows, modeled from 5 U.S.C. § 556 (APA):

(b) In cases involving fraud or willful misconduct, the Department or the program office that is the proponent of any agency action that is challenged by a request for hearing has the burden of proof to establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence, and is required to establish a prima facie case in support of the challenged agency action by the close of its case-in-chief. In cases involving allegations of an overpayment made to a provider, the Department or the program office shall have the burden of persuasion.

See also: DAB Decision No. CR 1059 (June 2003) (CMS has burden of proof to make prima facie case that provider was not in substantial compliance)."
There is simply no rational basis for the Department to place the burden of proof on a provider in the kinds of cases noted above. The Department provides none in the proposed rulemaking. The Advisory Committee adopted a different approach; and, the Department has chosen to ignore the Committee’s recommendations and analysis without any discussion in the rulemaking. The Department should amend the Proposed Rule, keeping in mind the prior admonition of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in J.S. v. Department of Public Welfare, 528 Pa. 243, 248 FN2, 596 A.2d 1114, 1114 FN 2 (1991), that different procedures are required in the different kinds of administrative appeals to meet constitutional requirements to protect the rights involved in each. We strongly object to the Proposed Rule as inconsistent with the Act and with the recommendations and vote of the Advisory Committee established by Act 142; and, continue to suggest that the Department adopt the approach to burden of proof used by federal agencies in provider matters. The resolution of this issue also impacts Proposed §41.181, relating to posthearing briefs. Briefing should follow the order of burden of proof; and, in cases where the Program Office must have the burden of proof, the Program Office must be required to brief first and have the right of reply. §§ 41.181(b,c), therefore, should be amended to replace “provider” with “party with the burden of proof” and “program office” with “the opposing party”.

8. Authority for the Rulemaking. During the Act 142 Advisory Committee meetings, we noted that the Department’s authority under Act 142 to promulgate regulations was limited and we argued that certain changes to 1 Pa. Code, Part II, that were discussed could only be made using the Department’s authority under the Administrative Agency Law (2 Pa. C.S. § 102(a)) in a proposed rulemaking proceeding. While our comments on those kinds of changes are discussed further below, we suggest that, since the Department has taken the cautionary step of proposed rulemaking in this case and is seeking public comment, the Department add to the authority relied on for the new BHA rules the Administrative Agency Law in order to preclude attacks on the Rules arising from that kind of technical omission. We continue to believe that our comments during the Advisory Committee process are correct and that Act 142 does not authorize the Department to make any change in MA providers’ rights to seek relief from the Secretary pursuant to 1 Pa. Code §§ 35.17-35.20, because Act 142 is limited to appeals involving decisions that are adjudications of the Department (§ 1101, definition of “Hearing”), as conceded in Proposed Rule 41.3, relating to the definition of “agency action”.
9. **Limitation on Scope of the Act.** In § 41.1(c), the Department improperly seeks to limit the scope of Act 142 to preclude Bureau authority under Act 142 in matters that involve the application of 55 Pa. Code Chapter 275, relating to appeal and fair hearing for applicants and recipients. The Act precludes the Department from limiting the scope of actions relating to the administration of the Medical Assistance Program that can be raised in a request for hearing. The Act expressly authorizes MA Providers to request a hearing before the Department with respect to any decision of the Department regarding the MA Program as to which the MA Provider is aggrieved (§ 1102(A)). The Department’s definition of “agency action” in Proposed Rule 41.3 is equally expansive and consistent with the Act. Where the Legislature has determined the class of matters eligible for administrative review, the Department is not authorized to limit that class of matters by regulation. While applicants and recipients continue to have a separate statutory right to obtain administrative review (62 P.S. § 423) concerning Department decisions affecting their rights, including the procedures established in 55 Pa. Code Chapter 275, some provisions of Chapter 275 (e.g., those relating to “interim assistance”) affect MA Providers’ rights to payment. We suggest that this Proposed Rule be amended to state: “This chapter does not apply to appeals brought by or on behalf of applicants for or recipients of Medical Assistance that are governed by Chapter 275 (relating to appeal and fair hearing and administrative disqualification hearings).

10. **Definition of “Hearing”.** Act 142 expressly defines “Hearing” (§ 1101). Proposed Rule 41.3 redefines “Hearing”. We suggest that the Department amend the definition to reflect the definition in the Act. The subsets in the Proposed Rule are not required. The subsets of the Proposed Rule are included in the GRAPP definition of a matter or proceeding, which is not superseded by the Proposed Rules.

11. **The Status of 1 Pa. Code § 35.20.** The Proposed Rules do not include 1 Pa. Code § 35.20 (relating to appeals from actions of the staff in § 41.3’s definition of “Petition for Relief”). Proposed Rule 41.31 (request for hearing) expressly supersedes § 35.20, as it must, with respect to the timing and content required for MA Provider appeals of “agency actions” as defined in Proposed Rule 41.3. This leaves a gap with respect to appeals that do not involve “agency actions” as defined by § 41.3, since the actions included in the § 41.3 definition and the Act are only “adjudicative actions”, whereas 1 Pa. Code § 35.20, as promulgated under the Administrative Agency Law, within the section dealing with “Petitions”, has not such limitation on the kinds of action subject to its provisions. If the Department intends to completely eliminate MA
Providers' rights to seek relief from actions of staff that are not "agency actions" as defined in the Proposed Rules or to limit § 35.20 to appeal of "agency actions", it should do so more directly in the Proposed Rule. We suggest the following addition to § 41.31(a): "...in accordance with this chapter; and, no appeals from actions of the staff shall be permitted except actions that are agency actions as defined in this chapter.

12. § 41.31(d)(iii) and Providers’ Right to and Need for Appropriate Orders

Granting Declaratory Relief. The Proposed Rule includes a reference to 1 Pa. Code § 35.18, but not to § 35.19, even though it required that proceedings under either rule be brought separately as petitions for relief. Nevertheless, the Department's preclusion of requests for declaratory relief in a request for hearing is inconsistent with the Act's requirement that decisions be binding on the Department and the provider and with the Act's requirement that the Bureau determine all contested issues of facts and law and enter "any appropriate order, decree or decision." The Bureau cannot by regulation alter the mandate of the Act. Declaratory relief is often appropriate for the resolution of provider appeals; and, the Act provides the Department with the right to seek review by the Secretary, pursuant to her authority under 62 P.S. § 403, to correct any inappropriate order. Declaratory relief is appropriate precisely because 62 P.S. § 403 requires the Secretary to strive for uniformity in the administration of the MA Program. If the Bureau determines in one provider's appeals that a Program Office has misinterpreted or misapplied a regulation in that case, there must be a way to prospectively change what the Program Office is doing so that the same problem does not have to be brought back to the Bureau for adjudication each time it recurs. The Proposed Rule should be amended to read as follows: "A provider may not request a declaratory order or an order that the Department should be required to promulgate, amend or repeal a regulation as relief in a request for hearing; [The requests shall be set forth] but may request such relief in accordance with 1 Pa. Code §§ 35.18 (relating to petitions for issuance, amendment, waiver, or deletion of regulations) and 35.19 (relating to petitions for declaratory orders). Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude a provider from including in a request for hearing or the Bureau from issuing an appropriate order for declaratory relief to correct and prevent misinterpretation or misapplication of law, regulations, policies or other guidance or instructions by a Program Office."
13. § 41.31(e). The Department should reconsider requiring a copy of the entire written notice where there is no transmittal letter, in order not to require an entire Remittance Advice Notice in disputes involve rejections of invoices. The Department could clarify such distinctions by adding a definition of “written notice” in § 41.3(a), as follows: “Written Notice — A written document sent to a Provider to provide notice of an agency action. Written Notice of the rejection of an invoice for payment is given by the page of a Remittance Advice Notice on which the rejection of that invoice appears.

14. Later Amendments Should Not Be Subject to the “Prejudice” Requirement in Proposed § 41.32(c)(2)(ii)(B). The Proposed Rule creates the risk of much unnecessary mischief and abuse in this provision; and, given the criteria which Pennsylvania courts have developed in the application of Pa. R.Civ.P. Rule 1033 (relating to amendments), the Proposed Rule is completely unnecessary because of the other limitation in the provision. The Pennsylvania rules on amendments are designed to assure that cases are determined on their merits and that justice is not denied due to technicalities. See: Horowitz v. Universal Underwriters, Inc., 580 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. 1990), appeals denied. The criteria in § 41.32(c)(2)(ii)(A), which otherwise limit later amendments to situations involving later discovery of information that contradicts Department disclosures or was not provided by the Department, preclude a finding of prejudice and are sufficient, as conceded by the Department in § 41.201 (relating to reopening). The Proposed Rule should be deleted.

15. § 41.32(f) should be conformed with § 41.32(g), as follows: “Subject to the requirements of subsection (g) below, [T]he Bureau will dismiss...”

16. Nunc Pro Tunc Relief and Extensions of Time. The Act requires the application of common law standards to applications for nunc pro tunc relief (§ 1102(C)). § 41.33 reflect the Act’s meaning and intent; however, § 41.33(d), relating to sections of GRAPP that are superseded is confusing, since the sections cited (§§ 35.1-35.11) do not deal with nunc pro tunc relief or with extensions of time (which is dealt with in GRAPP at § 31.15). In addition, the Department has regulations that deal with extensions of time to file appeals based on nunc pro tunc circumstances and other kinds of circumstances. For example, 55 Pa. Code §§ 1187.1(d)(2) and 6210.14(b) permit extensions of time to file appeals where an intervening natural disaster makes timely compliance impossible or unsafe. The relationship between § 41.33 and § 41.7 (relating to extensions of time) is unclear. § 41.33 deals with not only “appeals” but also with amendments to appeals, which is dealt with in § 41.32. Since the Act provides the
Department with discretion in this area, we suggest that § 41.33 be rewritten as follows to cure these concerns:

§ 41.33. Nunc Pro Tunc Relief.

(a) The Bureau, upon written motion and for good cause shown, may grant leave to a provider to file a request for hearing nunc pro tunc under the common law standard applicable in analogous cases in courts of original jurisdiction or where an intervening natural disaster or actions of third-parties makes timely compliance impossible or unsafe.

(b) The Bureau, upon written motion and for good cause shown, may grant leave to a provider, notwithstanding the limitations of § 41.32, to file an amendment to a request for hearing nunc pro tunc under the common law standard applicable in analogous cases in courts of original jurisdiction or where an intervening natural disaster or actions of third-parties makes timely compliance impossible or unsafe.

(c) The Secretary, upon written motion and for good cause shown, may grant leave to a party to file a request for review of a Bureau determination by the Secretary nunc pro tunc under the common law standard applicable in analogous cases in courts of original jurisdiction or where an intervening natural disaster or actions of third-parties makes timely compliance impossible or unsafe.

(d) Subsections (a)-(d) supersede 55 Pa. Code §§ 1187.1(d) and 6210.14(h) and 1 Pa. Code §§ 35/1–35.11.

17. Waiver Requests. § 41.41, relating to waiver requests in an effort to promote administrative economy unnecessary restricts the flexibility of the Department and providers to address situations where waiver requests are appropriate. Providers may seek waivers of regulations that extend across more periods of time than are involved in a request for hearing or in order to mold or prevent a later agency action. In order for such administrative process to be meaningful, the relief available through the petition process should not be subject to waiver because a provider does not thereafter seek a hearing on any particular related agency action. See: Twining Village v. Department of Public Welfare, 564 A.2d 1335 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989), appeals denied (Issued properly raised in interim rate appeal are not waived by failure to preserve them by filing later appeals of end-of-year audit and settlement). The Proposed Rule precludes the beneficial effects of such waiver requests and is inconsistent with the
limitations on the Bureau’s jurisdiction conceded in § 41.5(c). The proposed rule should be amended to protect both interests, as follows:

(a) A provider may include a waiver request in a petition for relief only if [the regulation that is the subject of the waiver request] the same waiver request is not already included in a pending request for hearing.

(b) Where a waiver request has already been included in a request for hearing and the same waiver request is also filed in a petition for relief, the Bureau will issue an order to show cause why the petition for relief should not be dismissed, with a date certain therein, and serve that order to show cause upon the provider.

(c) Where a waiver request was filed in a petition for relief prior to the date of an agency action that is thereafter the subject of a request for hearing and that waiver request seeks relief that would be applicable to that agency action, the provider may incorporate by reference the pending waiver request in a request for hearing and may request waiver relief specific to the agency action involved; however, the relief requested in a waiver request filed prior to the date of an agency action will not be waived by the failure of the provider to file a request for hearing or affect the authority of the Secretary to implement any waiver.

(d) ....

18. The Department’s effort to limit declaratory relief in Proposed § 41.42 is inconsistent with the Act and should be deleted. We discussed this issue above relating to Proposed § 41.31(d)(iii). For the same reasons, § 41.42 (relating to request for declaratory relief) should be deleted as inconsistent with the purpose and mandate of the Act. The Proposed Rule confuses a request for declaratory relief with a petition for declaratory order pursuant to 1 Pa. Code § 35.19. The two are not the same. Since the Department has discretion under 1 Pa. Code § 35.19 to entertain a petition for declaratory order, the Department may dismiss a petition for declaratory order where the relief requested can be effected through an appropriate order for declaratory relief in the context of a pending request for hearing. The principles discussed above with respect to waivers requests, however, are equally applicable to requests for declaratory relief. Such a request may seek relief that in order to mold or prevent later agency action. Where a later agency action involves questions previously raised in a petition for declaratory order, the provider should not be required to file a request for hearing as to each
subsequent agency action in order to preserve the question raised in the petition. See: Twining Village.

The purpose of administrative review is to achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of issues and disputes, not to require unnecessary hoops for the preservation of rights. If the Department wishes to clarify these points following the suggested amendments above for waiver requests, the proposed rule should be amended to read:

§ 41.42. Request for declaratory order [relief].

(a) A provider may include a request for declaratory order in a petition for relief only if [the relief sought by the provider would not modify or alter an agency action involving the provider] the same request is not already included in a pending request for hearing.

(b) Where a request for declaratory order has already been included in a request for hearing and the same request is also filed in a petition for relief, the Bureau will issue an order to show cause why the petition for relief should not be dismissed, with a date certain therein, and serve that order to show cause upon the provider.

(c) Where a request for declaratory order was filed in a petition for relief prior to the date of an agency action that is thereafter the subject of a request for hearing and that request for declaratory order seeks relief that would be applicable to that agency action, the provider may incorporate by reference the pending request for declaratory order in a request for hearing and may seek specific declaratory relief in the request for hearing as to the agency action involved; however, the relief requested in a request for declaratory order filed prior to the date of an agency action will not be waived by the failure of the provider to file a request for hearing or affect the authority of the Secretary to implement any declaratory order.

(d).....
19. **Utilization Review sanctions should not be subject to Proposed § 41.92.**

In § 41.92, the Department proposes to make certain kinds of appeals, that the Department implies are usually less complicated that others, subject to "expedited disposition" unless the Bureau, upon motion for good cause, orders otherwise. The Department's identification of the kinds of appeals that would benefit from the "expedited disposition" process nevertheless includes "the recovery of overpayments or improper payments through the utilization review process", an area that effects every provider type (55 Pa. Code § 1101.72), includes regulations that characterize such actions as "administrative sanctions (e.g., 55 Pa. Code §§ 1126.82(b), 1163.92, 1163.481), and can involve the application and validity of statistical sampling (55 Pa. Code § 1101.83). Since these determinations often involve disputes concerning "medical necessity" and "proper documentation" (e.g., 55 Pa. Code §§ 1151.71, 1187.101(d)), the Department's presumption that they should be handled on an expedited basis without the benefit of disclosures or discovery is unsupportable and inappropriate. Such matters often involve positions that depend, at least in part, upon the judgment, opinion, or testimony of an expert; and, therefore, require disclosures of expert opinions as in § 41.115, which the "expedited disposition" process presumptively excludes (§ 41.92(f)(8)). In addition, the burden of proof in these matters, as discussed above, should not be on the provider.

The "good cause" requirement of § 41.92(g) is insufficient to assure that complicated Utilization Review disputes will be afforded Due Process. We suggest that the Department amend that regulation to require that "good cause" exists in any Utilization Review case that involves the application of statistical sampling pursuant to 55 Pa. Code § 1101.83, lack of medical necessary or sufficient documentation of medical necessity, or any allegation of provider misconduct, as follows:

".... Good cause will be deemed to exist in a provider appeal where: (i) the amount of the recovery involved is based on statistical sampling; (ii) utilization review determined the payments were improper for either lack of medical necessity or lack of documentation demonstrating medical necessity; or, (iii) the recovery is based on provider misconduct."
20. The Proposed Disclosure Process is Not Designed to Assure a Just, Speedy and Inexpensive Determination of Provider Appeals and Is Subject to Abuse by Program Office Staff. In Proposed § 41.111 (Disclosures), the Department continues its divergence, without any explanation, from the rules implementing disclosures as a case management device in other administrative and court systems. In Proposed § 41.111(b), the Department requires the Program Office to provide information only about the people who issued the agency action involved and the information they relied, whereas in other disclosure protocols (e.g., under Uniform Federal Local Rule 26.1(A)(1), each party is to provide information on individuals likely to have discoverable information related to the dispute and documents within their control that may be used to support their position). The Proposed Rules are simply not designed to make available to the provider or to the Bureau the relevant information to assure a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the matter and place a burden on the provider to find relevant information while not requiring the agency to produce it. The difference between the divergent case management approaches is significant and relevant to mission of the Bureau in these matters.

Under the Proposed Rule, the Program Office is not required to disclose Department authority expressly contrary to the agency action that is in the possession of the Department but was not relied upon by the Program Office in issuing the agency action because they did not know about it or they chose to ignore it when issuing the agency action, even where the existence of such information may be alleged in the request for hearing. The Proposed § 41.111(b)(1) does not define “staff person” (those subject to disclosure by the Program Office) and whether that includes “consultants”, such as physicians or other professionals who play a role in the Utilization Review process or in the development of statistical samples used for agency actions. As a result, discovery will always be required to assess whether the Department has information in its possession related to the matter that the Program Office is not disclosing because neither the Program Office nor staff counsel is required to by the Proposed Rules to disclose information in the possession of the Department that contradicts the Program Office’s issuance of the agency action, information that Proposed § 41.32(c)(2)(ii)(A) concedes may exist in these matters. The application of Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(3), precluding counsel from knowingly failing to disclose to the Bureau legal authority known by counsel to be directly adverse to the position of the Program Office and not disclosed by opposing counsel, does not require staff counsel to check whether such legal authority exists; and, therefore, is not sufficient to assure justice in these cases.
Given the limitations that the Proposed Rules place on discovery (§ 41.120), the Program Office should be required to disclose more in response to a request for hearing, including not only the names of persons likely to have discoverable information and documents within the possession of the Department that may be used to support the agency action, but also: (1) statements of any unwritten "policy", directive, or standard relied on by the Program Office in issuing the agency action (including the person(s) authorizing or establishing such and their job descriptions and authority); (2) any written policy, directive, or standard previously used by the Department or the Program Office to guide agency determinations of issues involved in the agency action, but not relied on by the Program Office in issuing the agency action involved (including any information on the effective dates of such writings and the names and authority of the author(s)); (3) the job descriptions and authority of the persons directly involved in the agency action and of any officials or staff designated to testify on behalf of the Program Office; (4) copies of all unpublished administrative decisions of the Department on the issue(s) involved in the appeal, including decisions on reconsideration or review (whether issued by the Secretary or a designee); (5) any unpublished State or Federal court litigation in which the issue(s) involved in the appeal were previously determined or are currently being considered; and, (6) any amendment of the State Plan for Medical Assistance that has been submitted but not yet approved or correspondence between the Department and the Federal Government concerning the regulations involved in the matter or the specific issue involved in the matter.

21. Position Papers Cannot Always Quantify The Amount In Dispute. In Proposed §§ 41.113(b)(3-4), the Department mandates that the Provider include the "monetary amount is dispute" and "an explanation showing how the monetary amount was computed." While many matters subject to Act 142 may be capable of such quantification, many will not. In a termination case, where the termination remains in effect until and unless reversed, the monetary amount is not finalized until after the appeal has been finally determined. In nursing facility audit appeals, the monetary amount is not knowable under 55 Pa. Code Chapter 1187's current prospective reimbursement system until the appeal has been finally determined and the effects of the changes required, if any, are integrated into the rate databases for the several fiscal periods affected by that audit, each of which will not affected until after the request for hearing has been filed.
In nursing facility appeals, the provider also may be unable to quantify the monetary amount because the Department determines the database(s) involved to be privileged until they are publicly released. This is another reason (in addition to those noted above) why § 41.117(b), relating to penalties for noncompliance with position paper requirements, should be amended to permit providers to introduce documents not included in the position paper that relate to questions that they could not have included in the position paper at the time position papers are due through no fault of their own: here, information on monetary amount(s) that may become available at a later time as the Department publishes database information.

This same problem affects the Program Office’s Position Paper requirements in § 41.114, although more so. The Program Office should not be required by § 41.114(b) to waive any claim of prepublication database privilege in order to provide a counterstatement of the monetary amount is dispute just because the Program Office actually has the relevant information in its possession where the provider does not. In order to deal with these concerns, we suggest the following amendments to § 41.113(b) and § 41.114(b):

"§ 41.113(b) — . . . . (3) The monetary amount in dispute, if a sum certain in whole or in part as of the date the position paper is due. For any monetary amount in dispute that is not a sum certain as of the date the position paper is due, the provider only be required to identify the regulations that, if continued in effect, are applicable to determining such amount(s) in the future. . . . .

§ 41.114(b) — If the program office disputes the facts, citations or monetary amount, the program office will provide a counterstatement of the items in dispute. Where the program office has information that is privileged or that has not been published as final relating to the determination of the monetary amount(s) in dispute, the program office is not required to disclose such information in its position paper and may dispute the provider’s statement(s) based on publicly available information only."
Thank you for this opportunity to provide the Department with our comments, suggestions and objections to these Proposed Rules.

Best personal regards.

Very truly yours,

CAPOZZI & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Louis J. Capozzi, Jr., Esquire

cc: Robert E. Nyce, Executive Director, IRRC
    Members of Act 142 Advisory Committee
September 13, 2004

Department of Public Welfare
Attention: Randy J. Riley,
Administrative Law Judge
2330 Vartan Way (Second Floor)
Harrisburg, PA 17110

RE: WRITTEN COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS AND OBJECTIONS
Our Matter No. 377-03

Dear Administrative Law Judge Riley:

This supplements our written comments, suggestions and objections dated September 7, 2004, and addresses the Effective Date of the Proposed Regulations.

During our participation in the Advisory Committee process, we discussed with you and the Advisory Committee our concerns about the limitations in Act 142-2002 (the Act) on the Department’s authority to affect provisions of 1 Pa. Code Part II. These concerns are addressed again in our previous September 7, 2004 submittal on the Proposed Regulations. This supplemental submittal addresses one further aspect of those concerns as it relates to the conflict in the Proposed Regulations between the “Effective Date” stated in the Secretary’s Preamble to the Proposed Regulations (“The proposed rulemaking will be effective upon final-form publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletin”) and Proposed Rule 41.1, relating to Scope, which indicates that the Proposed Rules will be effective with respect to appeals filed on or after December 3, 2002.

The Act provides the Department with authority to establish by the Final Standing Practice Order rules governing “practice” before the Bureau that shall be effective until and unless modified by regulation (67 Pa. C.S. § 1102(G)). The Act provides the Department with authority to promulgate regulations establishing “Rules of Procedure as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [67 Pa. C.S. Chapter 11]” (67 Pa. C.S. § 1106(A)) (emphasis added). The Legislature choice of different words in these two sections of the Act must be given effect; and, indicates that the Department
Randy J. Riley, Administrative Law Judge
RE: WRITTEN COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS AND OBJECTIONS
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was not granted authority through the Final Standing Practice Order process to amend existing rules of “procedure” relating to matters not “before the Bureau” but otherwise before the Department pursuant to the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure codified in 1 Pa. Code Part II, such as requests for waivers of regulations pursuant to 1 Pa. Code § 35.18 or petitions for declaratory orders pursuant to 1 Pa. Code § 35.19, since such matters are not matters addressed to the authority of the Bureau but to the authority vested only in the Secretary (62 P.S. § 403; see also: Proposed Rule 41.5(c), relating to the limitations on the jurisdiction of the Bureau with respect to such applications).

The Act does not vest the Bureau with authority through the Final Standing Practice Order process to alter in any way the Secretary authority and the procedures established by 1 Pa. Code Part II for bringing to the Secretary petitions for waivers of regulations or for declaratory orders. The Department may only alter those codified procedures through rulemaking pursuant its authority under the Administrative Agency Law as the Department has sought to do in the Proposed Regulations. The General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure can only be superseded when an agency promulgated inconsistent regulations on the same subject (1 Pa. Code § 31.1(c)). Since the Act does not authorize the Department to promulgate regulations through the Final Standing Practice Order process, but only through rulemaking under § 1106 (which expressly grants the authority to “promulgate regulations”), the Final Standing Practice Order cannot reach any petition or other proceeding filed with the Secretary and not with the Bureau under the General Rules.

As noted in our September 7, 2004 Comments, Suggestions and Objections, any changes to the General Rules relating to procedures for filing and perfecting petitions to the Secretary authorized by the General Rules can only be effective when inconsistent regulations are promulgated and such regulations can only be promulgated pursuant to the Department’s authority under the Administrative Agency Law and not pursuant to the Act, since such regulations are not “necessary” to carry out the provisions of 67 Pa. C.S. Chapter 11, as required by the Act. Since the Secretary has determined and announced in the rulemaking that the Proposed Regulations will be effective only when published in final form in the Pennsylvania Bulletin, Proposed Rule 41.1 is contrary to law and inconsistent with the Secretary’s expressed effective date and must be changed.
We object to Proposed Rule 41.1 on this basis and continue our prior comment that the proposed change cannot be effective at all unless and until the Department amends the rulemaking to invoke its authority under the Administrative Agency Law to adopt rules of procedure inconsistent with the General Rules. We have already provided you with our suggestions for changes to Proposed Rules 41.41 and 41.42 to resolve our concerns in the text of those regulations. When the rulemaking is amended to invoke the Department’s Administrative Agency Law rulemaking authority, the Proposed Rule 41.1, relating to scope, consistent with the Secretary’s expressed determination, also should be amended, to read as follows:

§ 41.1. Scope.

(a) This chapter governs the practice and procedures in MA provider appeals and in petitions for relief filed by or on behalf of MA providers.

(b) In addition to this chapter, GRAPP and other applicable Departmental regulations apply to the practice and procedures in MA provider appeals, except as specifically superseded in relevant sections of this chapter.

(c) This chapter does not apply to appeals brought by or on behalf of applicants for or recipients of Medical Assistance that are governed by Chapter 275 (relating to appeal and fair hearing and administrative disqualification hearings).

(d) This chapter does not apply to provider appeals commenced before December 3, 2002.

(e) This chapter applies in cases filed on or after [December 3, 2002, but before July 1, 2003, except as follows:

(1) Nonconformity of a pleading or legal document with this chapter will not in itself be a basis for objection.
(2) Except for the time limits, schedules and periods specified in § 41.32 (relating to timeliness and perfection of requests for hearing) time limits, schedules and periods specified in this chapter do not apply. When this chapter sets forth a time limit, schedule or period, the parties may agree to an alternative time limit, schedule or period or the Bureau may issue an order specifying an alternative time limit or period as the Bureau deems appropriate. The date it is published in final form in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. For appeals filed from December 3, 2002 through to the effective date of this chapter, practice and procedure before the Bureau in MA provider appeals are subject to the 67 Pa. C.S. Chapter 11, GRAPP, and the rules governing practice before the Bureau in the Final Standing Practice Order adopted pursuant to 67 Pa. C.S. Chapter 11 at 33 Pa.B. 3053 (June 28, 2003).

(3) Sections 41.111—41.117 and 41.122 do not apply.

Thank you for this opportunity to provide the Department with our comments, suggestions and objections to these Proposed Rules.

Best personal regards.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Louis J. Capozzi, Jr., Esquire

cc: Robert E. Nyce, Executive Director, IRRC
Members of Act 142 Advisory Committee